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Brewer v. Department of Fish and Wildlife5/10/2000
the amount to be recovered. Id. The court stated: "A benefit has been conferred, but a counterbalancing burden has been imposed. This may work to the disadvantage of some, while it will work to the advantage of others." Id. In Sealey, the question was whether a products liability statute of repose impermissibly denied injured parties a remedy in violation of Article I, section 10. The court acknowledged that the statute at issue "does bar plaintiff's claim and deny him a remedy for what would otherwise be a legally cognizable injury." Sealey, 309 Or at 393. However, the court concluded, based on earlier case law, that it is a "proper function of legislatures to limit the availability of causes of action by the use of statutes of limitation so long as it is done for the purpose of protecting a recognized public interest." Id. at 394, quoting Joseph v. Burns & Bear, 260 Or 493, 502, 491 P2d 203 (1971). It was a "permissible constitutional legislative function to balance the possibility of outlawing legitimate claims against the public need that at some definite time there be an end to potential litigation." Id.
In short, the Oregon Supreme Court's case law appears to recognize the legislature's ability to strike some sort of balance between competing interests by redefining rights, including rights of action, even when such a redefinition alters or abolishes a remedy under some circumstances. The key would appear to be that there indeed has to be some sort of "balance," or legitimate trade-off, involved. The statutory scheme at issue in Neher failed because it attempted to confer a benefit on certain defendants but offered no corresponding benefit to the injured plaintiffs. By contrast, the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation law at issue in Kilminster did strike a legitimate balance by eliminating certain tort claims for injuries to employees but substituting a no-fault compensation system. Likewise, a legitimate balance was struck in Hale by an enactment that expanded the scope of liability of municipal corporations but limited the amounts of recovery. In Sealey, the legitimate trade-off was the provision of a products liability cause of action for plaintiffs but one that included, for the public's interest, a time limitation for bringing such an action.
As is clear from Sealey and Hale, not every injury must be remedied by monetary compensation for a statutory scheme to pass muster under Article I, section 10. The workers' compensation scheme, for example, insulates employers from tort liability for certain injuries to employees, even if the injury turns out not to be deemed compensable by the workers' compensation law. See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 149 Or App 49, 53-56, 941 P2d 1065 (1997), rev allowed 328 Or 40 (1998) (upholding this aspect of the workers' compensation law against Article I, section 10, challenge). Similarly, under Sealey, injuries caused by defective products after the expiration of the statute of repose are not remedied by monetary compensation. However, the legislation placing such limitations on causes of action nonetheless is permissible under Article I, section 10, because the legislature has the ability to alter causes of action by striking legitimate balances between competing interests.
The legislature has done so here, by permitting recreational landowners to limit their liability in the event that they choose to open their lands to the public for recreational purposes without charge. That legislative choice strikes an acceptable balance, by conferring certain benefits and certain detriments on both the landowners involved, and on the recreational users of that land. We conclude that the Act does not violate Article I, section 1
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