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American Hardware Insurance Group v. West One Automotive Group5/10/2000
lows from the actionable consequence of a wrongful act. In contrast, any "eviction" Ingolia suffered was a symptom of the termination. Ingolia did not sue defendant because he was not allowed to work in a particular place; he sued because he was not allowed to work for defendant at all. The specific context of the terms so obviously refers to a claim for the ejection of a person who asserts a possessory or other legal right to occupy particular premises that any suggestion to the contrary is implausible.
Defendant's argument is also implausible when viewed in the context of the policies as a whole. Identical provisions in both of the policies excluded from coverage claims for bodily injury to "a person arising out of any * * * ermination of that person's employment[.]" As defendant points out, that exclusion applies only to bodily injury and, therefore, does not directly defeat coverage for any personal injury claim made by Ingolia. However, the exclusion is significant for another reason: it demonstrates that the parties recognized a distinction between claims for eviction and claims for wrongful termination from employment. There is no reason to believe that the parties would use the term "eviction" to refer to termination from employment, when they have made it perfectly clear in a different context in the same policies that termination of employment is a concept with an independent meaning. ORS 42.230 (construe contracts so as to "give effect to all" provisions); Standley v. Standley, 90 Or App 552, 556, 752 P2d 1284, rev den 306 Or 413 (1988) (agreement should be interpreted to give meaning to all of its terms).
Defendant relies on an Arkansas decision in which the court held that a policy provision substantially identical to those involved in this case triggered an insurer's duty to defend a country club against a civil rights action filed by a high school student who was barred from using its facilities because of her race. INA v. Forrest City Country Club, 36 Ark App 124, 819 SW2d 296 (1991). The court held that coverage for wrongful eviction applied to the removal of a licensee from the insured's premises. Id. at 128. That case is distinguishable because it, unlike this case, did involve a person's right to remain on property; it did not involve a claim for wrongful termination of employment. The Arkansas court simply had no occasion to consider the issue at stake in this case. We also note that the Arkansas court did not use a methodology similar to ours in construing the term at issue. Rather than examining the plausible meaning of the term in the context in which it was used and in the broader context of the policy as a whole, as the Oregon courts do, Hoffman, 313 Or at 470, the Arkansas court simply concluded that the term "eviction" is ambiguous and applied a rule of construction in favor of the insured. INA, 36 Ark App at 127. Because Forrest City Country Club omitted a critical step of analysis under Oregon's methodology, we would not adopt its reasoning even if it were otherwise in point.
We conclude that the meaning of the term "eviction," as used in the policies, is clear in light of the context of its use and the broader context of the policies as a whole; it refers to a claim based on the removal of a person who asserts a right to occupy particular premises. It does not apply to a claim for wrongful termination from employment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on its declaratory judgment claim.
Affirmed.
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