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Wade v. Mahler5/17/2000
the prevailing party, awarding $5,300 in economic damages and $117.95 in costs. Defendant objected to the proposed money judgment and, before entry of final judgment, moved for "Partial (or Total) Satisfaction of Judgment" under ORS 18.510(2). That motion requested that the judgment be satisfied based on the fact that the damages awarded to plaintiff were paid as PIP benefits through plaintiff's insurance. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from a representative of defendant's liability insurance carrier, stating that plaintiff's PIP insurer had requested reimbursement for those benefit payments to plaintiff in the amount of $7,368.62. The affidavit also formally acknowledged that defendant's insurance company was obligated to make a reimbursement payment to plaintiff's PIP insurer in the sum of $5,300 or such sum determined by the court pursuant to ORS 18.510(3).
At the hearing on defendant's objections and motion, defendant argued that plaintiff's judgment should be offset either because of the PIP reimbursement or because of plaintiff's settlement with Neal. The trial court agreed that the jury verdict should be offset to zero because of PIP reimbursement and the settlement with Neal. The trial court further reasoned that, because plaintiff received a net money award of zero, judgment should be entered in favor of defendant and defendant should be designated as the prevailing party. The trial court then entered a judgment awarding defendant $1,000.50 in costs.
Plaintiff argues that offsetting her verdict by the amount of the PIP reimbursement or settlement with Neal is impermissible and that, alternatively, even if a satisfaction of the judgment by the PIP reimbursement is warranted, plaintiff is still the prevailing party and defendant should not be awarded costs. We conclude that the PIP reimbursement requires satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment but that plaintiff is the prevailing party.
We consider plaintiff's first assignment of error that it was impermissible to offset her judgment by the amount of her settlement with Neal. We agree. The trial court simply indicated that the jury was instructed about the settlement and that "defendant is entitled to a setoff in the amount of $7,500." However, ORS 18.580(1) provides, in part:
"In a civil action, when a [plaintiff] is awarded damages for bodily injury * * * which are to be paid by [a defendant], and the [plaintiff] received benefits for the injury * * * other than from the [defendant], the court may deduct from the amount of damages awarded, before the entry of final judgment, the total amount of those collateral benefits * * *." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, only if the injuries for which Neal paid were the same injuries for which defendant was liable under the judgment may defendant request the court to reduce plaintiff's judgment. See also Bird v. Norpac Foods, Inc., 325 Or 55, 67, 69-70, 934 P2d 382(1997) (legislature may alter the collateral source rule, and ORS 18.510 provides a means for obtaining an offset for collateral benefits received); McKee Electric Co. v. Carson Oil Co., 70 Or App 1, 8, 688 P2d 1360 (1984), aff'd 301 Or 339, 723 P2d 288 (1986) (collateral source rule embodies the principle that "a negligent defendant is liable for reasonably foreseeable consequential damages attributable to its negligence, and it is generally true that a defendant cannot escape that liability because the injured party is made whole by its own efforts or the efforts of others." (Emphasis added.))
Nothing in the record designated on appeal supports defendant's contention that the injuries were the same as alleged against Neal. Nowhere in her objections or motion or at the hearin
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