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Hargreaves v. Jack5/12/2000
This case came before the Court on the plaintiff's appeal from the entry of summary judgment in the Superior Court in favor of the defendants. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. The plaintiff, Gail Hargreaves (Gail or plaintiff), is the widow of John F. Hargreaves (Hargreaves), who, after nineteen years of service as a firefighter, suffered a fatal injury while in the course of his employment for the City of Pawtucket on August 22, 1993. He had responded to a fire at 100 Cottage Street in Pawtucket. While he was tending his pumper truck in accordance with departmental policy, and by order of his immediate supervisor, another superior officer ordered Hargreaves into the building. As the conditions worsened, the commanding officer decided to evacuate all firefighters from the building, but the officers in charge were unable to track the whereabouts of all personnel on the scene. Hargreaves was left behind in the building. By the time he was able to escape from the flames, he had suffered fatal injuries, and died one month later.
On March 22, 1996, plaintiff, individually and in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of John F. Hargreaves, filed a wrongful death action in Providence County Superior Court against the City of Pawtucket (city) and two superior officers. In this original complaint, she sought to hold these defendants liable for their alleged negligence in the management and supervision of the firefighting operation. She alleged that the ordering of Hargreaves into the building by his superiors, and the manner in which the battalion commander managed the fireground violated departmental policy.
Subsequent to the filing of this first action, this Court decided Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256 (R.I. 1996), in which we held that G.L. 1956 ' 45-19-1, otherwise known as the injured-on-duty (IOD) benefits statute, was the exclusive remedy for firefighters and police officers for injuries occurring in the line of duty. Believing that this Court's holding in Kaya essentially would bar her claims against the individual firefighters and the city, and because the statute of limitations was about to terminate in respect to the first action, plaintiff filed a second complaint against the individual police officers at the scene. She maintained that they were negligent in their provision of fireground support and security in the area surrounding the fire, and that this was a proximate cause of Hargreaves's injuries.
In her second action, plaintiff argued that Kaya does not extend to the individual police officers in the department, and, in the alternative, that the IOD statute violates certain federal and state constitutional provisions. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court with respect to the claims arising under the Federal Constitution, and then filed a motion to dismiss. A federal district court judge granted a motion to dismiss the federal claims, and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the claims arising under the Rhode Island Constitution. The judge remanded the remaining state law claims to the Rhode Island Superior Court. Both complaints were consolidated, and defendants moved for summary judgment on the wrongful death action, and to dismiss the second complaint. The trial justice granted both motions. Relying on our decision in Kaya, the trial justice held that the IOD statute was the exclusive remedy for a "firefighter injured in the line of duty," and that it precluded negligence suits against superior and fellow officers. The trial justice reasoned that this Court's dec
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