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Grillo v. Speedrite Products5/22/2000
damages . . . or whether those symptoms were the manifestation of temporary sickness or discomfort." Id. The court stated:
There is a substantial difference between knowledge of injury and the cause of that injury and mere suspicion. . . . The evidence shows that [the plaintiffs'] suspicions regarding their symptoms about TDI were either unconfirmed or denied at the time of their early employment with Whirlpool. If they had filed an action when they were employed at Whirlpool and complained of their symptoms, their claim may well have been dismissed as frivolous. A jury, like the plaintiffs' physicians, may have concluded that the plaintiffs' manifestations were unrelated to TDI exposure. Thus, if the plaintiffs had filed, a later cause of action could have been barred. We do not believe Minnesota's applicable statutes of limitation were intended to provoke the premature commencement of claims for temporary sickness or discomfort. Rather, the plaintiffs are entitled to wait until the cause has been rationally identified. Id. at 399. (emphasis added).
The Hildebrandt opinion cited the case of Schiele v. Hobart Corp., 587 P.2d 1010 (Or. 1978). Schiele is also an occupational disease case. A meat wrapper sued for permanent injuries from alleged exposure to polyvinyl chloride fumes caused by the use of a meat wrapping machine. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based upon the statute of limitations. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. Factually, the Oregon court noted the plaintiff began to experience a variety of health problems, including nausea, dizziness, choking, coughing, and difficulty catching her breath soon after she began using the meat wrapping machine. The court noted " lmost from the outset, the plaintiff associated these problems with the fumes which the machine generated as its hot wire cut the polyvinyl chloride meat wrapping film." Id. at 1011. The plaintiff''s health problems worsened until she was hospitalized approximately two years later with pneumonia. At that time, doctors informed her that her illness was possibly due to her exposure to polyvinyl chloride fumes on the job . Id. at 1012.
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the statute of limitations, the Oregon Supreme Court noted "the statute of limitations on claims involving negligent infliction of an occupational disease does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or as a reasonably prudent person should know, that he has the condition for which his action is brought and that the defendant caused it." Id. at 1013. The court stated:
e reject defendants' claim that knowledge of symptoms and their causal relationship to defendants' actions in and of itself initiates the running of the statute. We do not believe the legislature intended that the statute be applied in a manner which would require one to file an action for temporary sickness or discomfort or risk the loss of a right of action for permanent injury. The statute of limitations begins to run when a reasonably prudent person associates his symptoms with a serious or permanent condition and at the same time perceives the role which the defendant has played in inducing that condition. Id. at 1014. (emphasis added). See also Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. 1998)(In a latent occupational disease case, a cause of action accrues whenever a "plaintiff's symptoms manifest themselves to a degree or for a duration that would put a reasonable person on notice that he or she suffers from some injury and he or she knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the injury is likely work-related."); Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc.,
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