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Holzer v. Dakota Speedway5/17/2000
onscious disregard of an unreasonable and substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another." Id.
[ ] Although Holzer raises this legal claim, the record does not contain any supporting facts showing Speedway recklessly or consciously disregarded any risk of harm to him. Seven concrete barricades, each approximately three feet high, served as a protective wall "to protect the pit people and drivers from any oncoming cars or anything that came off the track."
[ ] Holzer also alleges that because the pit area in use on the night of his accident was not the interior pit area, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it contributed to his accident. However, Ellingson stated in his affidavit " hat evening and throughout the last 3 years, we've been pitting on the outside of the racetrack." Thus, Speedway had already been using that pit area regularly, and there is no evidence in the record indicating any accidents had occurred in those three years because of its location of the pit area. There is nothing in the record to create a question of fact that Speedway knew or had reason to know of an unreasonable risk of harm to Holzer or other pit workers because of the location of the pit area. See Huber v. Hovey, 501 NW2d 53 (Iowa 1993) (summary judgment affirmed in favor of raceway based upon a release where a person standing in a pit area was struck by a wheel and axle that had become detached from a car participating in a race); Kellar, 509 NW2d at 96 (stating plaintiff failed to allege defendants knew or had reason to know of an unreasonable risk of harm to her or flagging workers because of the design of the structure at her station on the racetrack where she was injured).
[ ] Nor has Holzer alleged Speedway knew or had reason to know of any defects in the race car from which the wheel and tire broke loose. See id. The circuit court was correct when it stated in its letter opinion, " pon searching the file I can find no willful, wanton or intentional conduct which would place an issue of fact in question taking it out of the release area." See Lee, 337 NW2d at 829.
[ ] The complained of conduct and the type of accident that occurred are clearly contemplated by, and within the scope of the release. Holzer has failed to provide any evidentiary support for a claim of willful or reckless acts that would place Speedway's conduct outside the coverage of the release.
[ ] Holzer also argues the release violates public policy because it involves a public interest in recreation. We do not agree. Besides South Dakota, releases by participants in automobile races have been upheld and found not to violate any public policy in a number of jurisdictions. See Nadel, supra at 635 (citing cases); Gore v. Tri-County Raceway, Inc., 407 FSupp 489, 492 (MDAla 1974) (citing Doster v. C.V. Nalley, Inc., 95 GaApp 862, 99 SE2d 432 (1957); Seymour v. New Bremen Speedway, Inc., 31 OhioApp2d 141, 287 NE2d 111 (1971); Theroux v. Kedenburg Racing Assn., 50 Misc2d 97, 269 NYS2d 789; Lee v. Allied Sports Associates, 349 Mass 544, 209 NE2d 329 (1965); Corpus Christi Speedway v. Morton, 279 SW2d 903 (TexCivApp 1955)).
[ ] Some courts have found exculpatory releases violate public policy when they involve a matter of interest to the public at large or the state. Seaton v. East Windsor Speedway, Inc., 582 A2d 1380, 1382 (PaSuper 1980). However, the public interest in recreation typically involves a facility providing an essential or public service. See Sutton, supra at 528. Other matters of interest to the public or state include "the employer-employee relationship, public service, public utilities, common carriers, and hospitals." Seaton, 582 A2d at 1382 (citing Leidy
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