 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Peek5/3/2000
e concerning DNA evidence. Further, the trial court noted the following at the hearing on defense motion for a new trial:
And about the prosecutorial misconduct of Lee Davis, of course, I always charge the jury, and I told them before the trial started and after, that statements by attorneys and even the questions that attorneys make are not evidence, and so I don't find that Lee Davis made any, was guilty of any misconduct.
We agree that the allegation that the prosecutor essentially became a witness for the State is without merit.
The defendant further contends that the prosecutor acted improperly by stating that the defense would not call any witnesses who would disagree with the reliability of DNA evidence. The prosecutor stated in opening argument to the jury:
There will be no one - I suggest to you it doesn't matter who the defense calls, there will be no one who will take that witness stand and tell you you can't believe DNA. If they choose to call someone -and they don't have to, I'll make that clear, they don't have to, they have absolutely no obligation to - but should they choose to, no one will, in this day and age, take the witness stand and say what they said about fingerprints, you know, in 1892, You can't trust them. There'll be nobody, because we've evolved past that point. In the last ten years, we have seen DNA do amazing things.
The general reliability of DNA evidence has been determined by the legislature in Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-7-117. Therefore, the prosecutor was making an observation that is undisputed. The prosecutor also made it clear that the defense was under no obligation to present any evidence at all. We note further that this case was not a close one but one where the evidence of the defendant's guilt was substantial. We conclude that this issue is without merit.
VII. CHANGE OF VENUE
In his seventh issue, defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for a change of venue.
The judgment of the trial court concerning the necessity to change venue in a criminal prosecution may be reversed only in a "strong case of error, apparent upon the record." State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 877 (Tenn. 1991). The record does not reflect any difficulty encountered in the process of impaneling an impartial jury. Defendant offers nothing on appeal to support his allegation that the jury was biased by pretrial publicity. This issue is without merit.
VIII. SENTENCING
In his final issue, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence for each conviction and in ordering that his sentences be served consecutively.
Review by this court of the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence is de novo on the record with a presumption that the determination made by the trial court is correct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1997). This presumption applies unless the record demonstrates that the sentencing court did not properly consider sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. See State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).
A. Application of Enhancement Factors
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum penalty for each offense, with the sentences for crimes committed against each individual victim to run concurrently as to that individual victim, and consecutively, one victim to the next. The trial court found no mitigating factors but found three enhancement factors:
(1) The defendant has a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior i
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|