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Finley v. Steenkamp5/18/2000
days for "all parties and potential parties," including CDS. CDS, on the other hand, contends that "all parties and potential parties" refers to only those parties involved in the health care liability claim, i.e., physicians and health care providers.
C. Statutory Interpretation
Our primary objective in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. See Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. 1997). If possible, we are to discern legislative intent from the plain meaning of the words of the statute. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 960 (Tex. 1999); Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. 1993). We do not, however, interpret statutory language so rigidly "that the almost certain intent of the Legislature is disregarded." City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1995). Instead, the court must consider the consequences that would follow from its construction of a statute and avoid absurd results. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991). Moreover, legislative intent must be determined from the entire act, not from isolated portions thereof. See Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1998).
D. Analysis
As noted above, in construing section 4.01(c), Finley would have us to hold that the Legislature intended the "all parties and potential parties" language to toll the statute of limitations applicable to his negligence claim against CDS. After considering the consequences of this interpretation, we respectfully decline to do so. First, this interpretation would lead to absurd results. Under this construction, section 4.01 would toll for 75 days the statute of limitations applicable to any lawsuit filed against any defendant-e.g., an action for negligence, battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress-provided that suit also involved (either legitimately or otherwise) presuit notice of a claim to a health care provider under article 4590i. Furthermore, this interpretation would allow plaintiffs to bring sham lawsuits against health care providers in order to obtain additional time to file their legitimate claims against parties not covered under the Act.
Second, in determining legislative intent, we are to consider the nature and object sought to be obtained by the Legislature. See Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d at 438. Article 4590i was enacted to curb escalating medical care costs resulting from the increasing number of health care liability claims being filed. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 1.02. The Legislature passed section 4.01 to give health care providers and physicians 60 days before a health care claim was filed to try to settle the case without the expense of litigation. See De Checa v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., Inc., 852 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. 1993); Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp., 652 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1983). At the same time, the Legislature sought to protect the health care claimant's right to maintain his lawsuit by tolling the applicable statute of limitations for 75 days. See De Checa, 852 S.W.2d at 938; Schepps, 652 S.W.2d at 937. We do not see how adopting Finley's argument to apply this tolling provision to all claims brought in conjunction with a health care liability suit, even if the claim is not brought against a health care provider, furthers the Legislature's purpose in enacting this statute.
Finally, we note that section 1.02 of the Act expressly provides that in passing article 4590i, the Legislature intended to "make certain modifications to the liability laws as they relate to health care liability claims only and
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