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Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Roberson5/11/2000
arly within the province of the jury to determine the dollar amount of a plaintiff's pain and suffering. Lege v. Jones, 919 S.W.2d 870, 877 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). There are no objective guidelines by which a court may measure the money equivalent of mental pain, and much discretion must be allowed to the jury in fixing this amount. Green v. Meadows, 527 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the case at bar, the jury's awards for past and future pain and mental anguish are supported in the evidentiary record.
Mr. Roberson suffered a torn medial meniscus of the left knee on October 10, 1991, and he submitted for surgical repair of that injury on December 13, 1991. The injury and corrective surgery contributed to post-traumatic degeneration of the medial compartment of the knee, and he is now a candidate for and may require in the future both arthroscopic and total-knee replacement surgeries. Mr. Roberson testified to his complaints of pain from the time of injury through to the present, his co-employees corroborated this testimony with their own eyewitness accounts, and Drs. Bocell and Butler agreed that such symptoms are consistent with the injury and post-traumatic progression. In fact, Dr. Butler testified in great detail as to the pain that Mr. Roberson will likely experience in the period of time immediately preceding his total knee replacement. Under these circumstances, the jury's award of $85,000 for six years of progressively worsening pain, and $250,000 for the severe symptoms which are unavoidable in the future, is reasonable.
The jury awarded Mr. Roberson $150,000 for past physical impairment and $375,000 for future impairment. Regarding past impairment covering approximately a six year period of time, the jury heard evidence that Mr. Roberson's knee "pops" and "cracks"; that the knee swells with activity; that Mr. Roberson has difficulty standing for long periods of time; that Mr. Roberson has difficulty ascending and descending stairs; and that he cannot kneel down. This is evidence of impairment, both past and present, which the jury was entitled to consider in reaching their award of $150,000. To remit this award, as suggested by appellant, would require this Court to go behind the jury's consideration, determination, and weighing of the evidence. This we cannot do and find that the evidence of past physical impairment is sufficient to support the jury's award.
The award of $375,000 for future physical impairment is somewhat different in that for the most part such damages are based in and upon conjecture as to how Mr. Roberson's present and past impairment may play out in the future. Medical evidence supports that at some point in time, Mr. Roberson will need a knee replacement. The medical evidence is vague as to when a knee replacement will be required, and wholly wanton as to a prognosis following such knee replacement. In White v. Sullins, 917 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1996, writ denied), we discussed the speculative nature of certain types of physical damage awards as follows:
In deciding Sullian's damages the jury was instructed it could consider several elements including some Sullins would incur in the future: physical pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, and disfigurement. Such damages are necessarily speculative and particularly within the jury's province to resolve. Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360, 365-66 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, writ denied), Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Dryden, 735 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1987, no writ). The mere fact the jury's award is large does not indicate the jury considered passion, prejudice, sympathy, or other circum
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