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In re Onstad5/24/2000 r claimed, either before this Court or the trial court, that this monetary sanction threatens the party's willingness or ability to continue the litigation.
In the words of the Texas Supreme Court:
However, if a district court imposes monetary sanctions that are made payable prior to the entry of a final appealable order, a litigant may suffer a substantial restriction on his access to the courts. Financially strapped because of the sanctions award, a litigant is unable to proceed with his case on the merits. To avoid this harsh, inequitable scenario, we conclude that if a litigant contends that a monetary sanction award precludes access to the court, the district judge must either (1) provide that the sanction is payable only at a date that coincides with or follows entry of a final order terminating the litigation; or (2) makes express written findings, after a prompt hearing, as to why the award does not have such a preclusive effect. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929 (emphasis added), quoting Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 882-82 n.23 (5th Cir. 1988).
In summary, the imposition of monetary sanctions, such as attorney's fees, is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment and, for that reason, is not subject to mandamus. Tjernagel v. Roberts, 928 S.W.2d 297, 303 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, orig. proceeding); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Tyson, 862 S.W.2d 728, 736 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, orig. proceeding); Susman Godfrey, L.L.P. v. Marshall, 832 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
Relator does not contend before the trial court, nor does he contend before this Court, that the monetary sanction the trial court imposed will affect his ability to appeal the sanctions order after final judgment. Neither does he contend before the trial court or before this Court that he is unable to pay the sanction. See Braden, 811 S.W.2d 922. We conclude that relator has an adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus will not lie.
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, and considering the size of the sanction imposed, we suspend that portion of the trial court's order directing Onstad to make payment directly to the counsel involved, and instead order Onstad to pay the sanction into the registry of the court within thirty days of this opinion, to be deposited by the clerk pursuant to law, where it will remain until the final conclusion of the underlying proceeding and any appeal thereof.
Donald R. Ross Justice
Date Submitted: May 23, 2000
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