 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Huckaby v. A.G. Perry & Son5/2/2000
whole case turns on the evidence improperly admitted or excluded. McEwen, 975 S.W.2d at 27; Cook v. Sabio Oil & Gas, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 106, 111 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, pet. denied). Errors in admitting evidence will not require reversal unless that evidence controlled the judgment. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989).
The defense in this case relied heavily on showing that Lamon had not been negligent and did not proximately cause the accident because of the dangerous road situation. Yet the testimony introduced by Trooper Shipley claiming that there were ten to twenty similar accidents does not in any way show that the same highway conditions that caused Lamon's acts also caused the other accidents. The question that essentially ended the jury's inquiry in this case was question one, which asked the jury: "Did the negligence, if any, of Lester Donald Lamon proximately cause the occurrence in question?" The jury answered, "No."
The defense's evidence was calculated to fully convince the jury that the road conditions were the proximate cause of this occurrence, and the jury found that Lamon's negligence did not proximately cause the occurrence.
It is difficult to determine from the evidence what specific state of road condition Lamon claims was the cause of the occurrence. There was heavy traffic, as in many metropolitan areas of Texas. There was no acceleration lane or access ramp onto the northbound highway, which is a road condition that exists at many intersections in Texas. It was pointed out that there were no warning signs informing drivers that the median was not wide enough for some trucks to stop safely or that there was no acceleration or access ramp. There were no signs or flashing lights warning drivers of U. S. 59 that there was a crossing. The evidence showed that there was not much lighting at the intersection, and that a later intersection built by the highway department rerouting the traffic had better lighting and flashing light warnings for oncoming motorists.
However, the evidence in this case does not show that any of these factors, except the busy highway, was the cause of the occurrence in this case, nor were these factors shown to be the cause of the other accidents. Similarity cannot be based on a generalized statement that this was a dangerous stretch of highway. The proponent must establish with more specificity that the prior accidents occurred in a similar manner and could be attributed to a similar causation.
We find the error was harmful, and this point of error is sustained.
In their eighth point of error, the Huckabys contend that the trial court erred in admitting testimony about acts and omissions of the Texas Department of Transportation, and about highway design, for which the Department is immune from suit. They argue that the defendants simply want to put the crossover itself on trial, as well as the dense traffic thereon. They contend that what the department did or did not do is irrelevant and inadmissible because the State is immune from suit and, therefore, is a non-responsible third party. The Huckabys then cite to the contribution and comparative responsibility statutes in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ยงยง 33.003, 33.011(4), (6)(A)(iii), (6)(B)(i) (Vernon 1997) for the proposition that the State would have to be a responsible third party, i.e., negligent, for evidence of its actions to be admissible. However, the act of a third party that is determined to be the sole proximate cause of a collision is a complete defense to a negligence suit regardless of whether such third party was negligent. See Rodriguez v. Moerbe, 963 S.W.2d 808, 820-21 (Tex. App.-San Antoni
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|