 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center6/29/2000
tice actions constitutional. While the statute upheld in Jones was substantially similar to the one at hand, the case was not decided under Article I, § 7 regarding the right to trial by jury. In fact, the right to jury trial was apparently never argued to this Court or the district court below. Instead, the constitutionality of the statute at issue in Jones was decided under the "open courts" provision of Article I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution. Therefore, the holding in Jones does not directly support WRMC's argument that I.C. § 6-1603 does not violate the right to jury trial.
WRMC argues, even if Jones does not directly support their argument, it nevertheless stands for the proposition that the legislature has the power to abolish or modify common law rights. If the legislature can abolish common law rights, it therefore has the power to limit the remedies available for a cause of action. In support of this argument, WRMC cites to Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp, 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D.Md. 1989) and Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4 th Cir. 1989). In each of these cases, the courts reasoned that if the legislature could abolish a cause of action, it necessarily had the power to limit the damages recoverable for the cause of action. For example, in Franklin the court noted " f the legislature can act within its proper sphere of authority and completely eliminate a cause of action for negligence or repeal whole categories of recoverable damages under recognized torts, then it must follow that the legislature has the power to define causes of actions and limit categories of recoverable damages for reasonable policy considerations . . . ." Franklin, 704 F.Supp. at 1333. We believe a similar rationale applies to this case. It is clear that, under the Idaho Constitution, the legislature has the power to modify or repeal common law causes of action. See IDAHO CONST. art. XXI, § 2; I.C. § 73-116 (1999). Consistent with this power, the legislature has limited, and/or eliminated, the liability of defendants in certain personal injury cases involving governmental entities, employment, ski and recreation activities, etc. See, e.g., I.C. § 6-904 (limitation on liability of governmental entities); I.C. § 6-1101-1109 (limitation on liability of ski area operators); I.C. 72-209 (providing the worker's compensation law provides the exclusive remedy against an employer). Similarly, the legislature has enacted statutes of limitation and repose which can effectively prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages in personal injury cases. We can discern no logical reason why a statutory limitation on a plaintiff's remedy is any different than other permissible limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to recover in tort actions.
Additionally, as WRMC notes, at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted, there were territorial laws providing for double and treble damages in certain civil actions. See, e.g., REV. STATUTES OF IDAHO TERRITORY, 1887, Title VII, Ch. IV, § 1336 (owner of quartz mill who does not enclose the mill liable for double the damage suffered by owner of livestock that may enter and drink the water or acids); REV. STATUTES OF IDAHO TERRITORY, 1887,Title X, Ch. II, § 4533 (allowing treble damages against anyone who unlawfully removed timber from another's land); REV. STATUTES OF IDAHO TERRITORY, 1887, Title X, Ch. II, § 4533 (allowing damages three times the amount of actual damages suffered from an unlawful or forcible entry). Therefore, the Framers could not have intended to prohibit in the Constitution all laws modifying jury awards. While the statutes cited by WRMC all increased the penalty against a defendant, rather than reducing the damages as I.C. § 6-1603 does, they nevertheless did "modify" the jury's
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Idaho Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|