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Anderson Highway Signs v. Close5/4/2000
e applies when the claimant is free of contributory negligence. Indeed, subsection (c) indicates the statute will apply " hether or not the claimant is free of fault." Thus, they argue the 1994 amendments must be read as a substantive change to the 1986 statute and the 1986 statute should, therefore, be read to uphold the district court's action. See Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1300 (Wyo. 1979). First, not every amendment to a statute must be interpreted as a substantive change in the law. Romero v. Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 369 (Wyo. 1993) ("'where, in the enactment of a law, the legislature employs in a subsequent clause of the same act or in later legislation on the same subject language clarifying a doubtful expression theretofore used, the court should give that language the meaning the legislature intended.'" quoting State Bd. of Equalization v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 54 Wyo. 521, 540, 94 P.2d 147, 153 (1939)); Matter of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo. 1980). More importantly, we have concluded that Martinez interpreted the 1986 statute in a manner consistent with the 1994 amendments. Therefore, we interpret the 1994 amendments as a clarification embodying our interpretation of the 1986 statute as found in Martinez.
CONCLUSION
Applying Wyo. Stat. Ann. ยง 1-1-109(d), it is clear the district court erred in assigning to Anderson the obligation of paying 100% of the Closes' damages. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute dictates that Anderson is only responsible for 50% of the damages, in proportion to its percentage of fault. We reverse the judgment and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.
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