 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
West v. Buchanan6/11/1999
se on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party."[ ]
In determining how to interpret a particular rule, we are guided by the purpose of the rule. The purpose of Rule 15(c) is remedial: The rule is meant to liberalize the rules of pleading and to "allo amendments for clarification and/or correction of the original complaint without being barred by the statute of limitations." And the purpose of statutes of limitations is to protect defendants from the inJustices that may result from the prosecution of stale claims.
With these goals in mind, we turn to the issue before us: whether Buchanan, as the party who was brought in by amendment, received notice of the institution of the action and knew, or should have known, that she was the proper defendant "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against ." Buchanan suggests that because the lawsuit was filed on the last day available under the statute of limitations, and she did not learn of it that day before the statute expired, the amendment substituting her as a party cannot relate back to the original complaint.
Buchanan argues that our decision in Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. is dispositive of this issue. In Adkins, Adkins had timely filed suit against Standard Oil and others for personal injuries. After the statute of limitations ran, Adkins attempted to amend his complaint to add Nabors, arguing that this was permitted by Rule 15(c). Adkins's position was that notice of the underlying facts of the action was the same as notice of the institution of the action. Relying on a federal court's interpretation of the word "action" in the analogous federal rule, we rejected this claim:
"Under this interpretation, any knowledge that Nabors may have had concerning Adkins' injury is irrelevant. Adkins must prove that Nabors actually knew of his suit against Standard prior to the limitations period. Adkins filed suit on July 20, 1977. The limitations period expired on August 9, 1977. In order for the amendment to relate back, Nabors must have learned of the lawsuit during this twenty-day period."[ ]
Thus, we interpreted the notice provision of Civil Rule 15(c) to require notice of the lawsuit, as opposed to mere notice of the facts underlying the action.
We disagree that Adkins controls this case. Adkins focused on the interpretation of the term "action" as used in the phrase "notice of the institution of the action," rather than the phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against [the party]." And contrary to the Dissent's assertion, we did not determine in Adkins that "the period provided by law for commencing the action" refers to the limitations period. Thus, Adkins did not address a situation, such as this, in which the substituted defendant learned of the plaintiff's cause of action after the statute of limitations had run but before expiration of time for service on the original defendant.
Moreover, after we decided Adkins, we suggested in Siemion v. Rumfelt that notice within the time for service could be adequate under Rule 15(c). In Siemion, we decided that a complaint against Jeffrey Rumfelt's father could be amended to include Jeffrey because of our view that "Jeffrey Rumfelt received sufficient notice of the subject claim" and our "belie[f that] it is reasonable to infer that Jeffrey had notice of the institution of the suit within the same time he would have known had he been a properly named defendant."
While Civil Rule 15(c) is not a model of clarity, we conclude
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Alaska Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|