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West v. Buchanan6/11/1999
that the language "within the period provided by law for commencing the action" must be interpreted to encompass, when the complaint is timely filed, the reasonable time for service of process permitted by the rule for a named defendant. The rule's language combines the separate concepts of commencement of an action with notice of the institution of the action. But an action may be filed and thus commenced without imparting notice to the defendant. Notice is usually given by service, which may take place as long as 120 days after filing. As a result, a properly named defendant may not receive notice of an action until 120 days after the statute of limitations runs. We can think of no reason why the rule would require the added defendant to receive notice earlier than a named defendant who is sued on the last day of a limitations period. Thus, we conclude that Rule 15(c) refers to the process of commencing an action, rather than merely filing a complaint; that process includes both timely filing and timely service.
We note that the prevailing interpretation of Rule 15(c)'s federal counterpart is not a bar to our decision today. In Schiavone v. Fortune, the United States Supreme Court construed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3) to require notice to the intended defendant within the time for filing a complaint under the applicable limitations period. The Schiavone court stated that the "plain language" of the Rule dictated its result even though "there is an element of arbitrariness here." But as one commentator has noted, the "disputed language is anything but plain, much less clear." Justice Stevens, joined by two other Justices, came to a different Conclusion than the Court's majority when interpreting the same "plain language":
"The language . . . does not, however, refer to the statute of limitations. Rather, it describes "the period provided by law for commencing the action against him" (emphasis added). As I have noted, that period includes two components, the time for commencing the action by the filing of a complaint and the time in which the action "against him" must be implemented by the service of process. If the party is sufficiently described in the original complaint to avoid any possibility of prejudice to the defendant, I see no reason for not construing the Rule to embrace both components of the period provided by law for bringing a timely action against a particular defendant."[ ]
Furthermore, as even the Dissent acknowledges, commentators have heavily criticized this result. As one commentator explains, the Schiavone decision is troubling for several reasons:
"The majority's decision effectively vitiates the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general and of Rule 15(c) in particular. . . . Moreover, the Schiavone Court's interpretation is clearly not in accord with Rule 8(f) in that the construction of Schiavone's pleading cannot, in any light, be seen as accomplishing substantial Justice."
". . . [Finally,] f a complaint against a particular defendant must be filed within the limitations period to survive Rule 15(c) scrutiny, as the Court seems to suggest, there is no need for the relation-back doctrine at all where the changing of a party is involved."[ ]
Finally, other state courts, when faced with interpreting state rules analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3) in the aftermath of Schiavone, have not felt constrained to follow the Schiavone decision with "blind devotion." As the Arizona Supreme Court explained, " t would be foolish indeed to interpret such a rule so narrowly as to allow its use only in those cases in which it was not needed because the statute of limitations
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