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West v. Buchanan6/11/1999
had not yet run."
Because we are not bound by a decision of the United States Supreme Court when interpreting a state rule of civil procedure and because we find these critiques of Schiavone persuasive, we decline to follow the Schiavone rationale. As long as a claim is filed within the time permitted by the applicable statute of limitations and served within the time permitted for service, the purposes of both Rule 15(c) and our statutes of limitations are satisfied. As Justice Stevens stated in his Dissent in Schiavone:
"The principal purpose of Rule 15(c) is to enable a plaintiff to correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the correction will not prejudice his adversary in any way. That purpose is defeated -- and the Rule becomes largely superfluous -- if it is construed to require the correction to be made before the statute has run."[ ]
Our interpretation of Rule 15(c) better serves the rule's purpose than a reading that would preclude the relation back of an amendment where the intended defendant receives notice that is timely but that comes after the deadline for filing the complaint. We note that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) has been amended to substitute "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him" with "the period provided by Rule 4 for service of the summons and complaint." We regard this as further evidence both of the purpose of the rule and that our interpretation is faithful to the achievement of this purpose.
We thus conclude that West has met the requirements of Rule 15(c): She has proved that Buchanan received notice of the institution of the action and knew or should have known before expiration of the period for commencement of the action that Buchanan was the proper party in the suit. In this case, Buchanan received notice identical to Bembry's. Although West's complaint named Bembry as the driver, both Bembry and Buchanan knew that Buchanan was the driver. According to Buchanan, she accompanied Bembry to pick up the certified letter containing the complaint. Upon reading the complaint, both Bembry and Buchanan should have found it obvious that the complaint mistakenly named Bembry rather than Buchanan.
Given these circumstances, to say that Bembry received timely and adequate notice but Buchanan did not would seem little more than senseless formalism. Thus, it was error for the superior court to dismiss West's action against Buchanan on statute of limitations grounds.
V. CONCLUSION
Because we hold that West's amended complaint substituting Buchanan as defendant related back to the time of its initial filing, we REVERSE the superior court's dismissal of West's action against Buchanan and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
EASTAUGH, Justice, with whom COMPTON, Justice, joins, Dissenting.
The result the court's opinion reaches today is foreclosed by the controlling rule, our past decisions, and authoritative interpretation of the identical federal rule. And it should also be foreclosed by reticence to rely on a theory not raised or argued by the parties. I would affirm dismissal of West's amended complaint as untimely; it did not relate back to West's timely original complaint.
A. Facts
While driving William Bembry's car, Hiltrud Buchanan collided with Carmen West's vehicle. The collision occurred on June 17, 1993. On June 16, 1995, West commenced suit by filing a complaint naming William Bembry as the only defendant. The two-year statute of limitations expired the day after West sued Bembry. Because West served Bembry by mail, Bembry did not receive notice of t
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