 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Green v. Southern United Fire Insurance Co.6/23/2000
ategory of cases the legislature intended to be subject to the reduced period provided for in the amendment. See Matthews v. Fontenont, 99-0484, p. 3 (La. 4 Cir. 9/29/99), 745 So.2d 691, 693.
Additionally, article 561 prescribes the method of enforcing a substantive right and is procedural in nature, rather than substantive. Dempster v. Louisiana Health Services & Indemnity Company, 98-1112 at p. 3, 730 So.2d at 525. As such, it may be applied retroactively as long as the retroactive application does not operate to disturb vested rights. Matter of American Waste and Pollution Control, 597 So.2d 1125, 1128 (La. App. l Cir), writs denied, 604 So.2d 1309, 1318 (La. 1992).
Plaintiff insists that the retroactive application of the shorter time period constitutes a deprivation of her vested right in her cause of action without due process of the law and is therefore unconstitutional. We disagree.
In Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521, 523-524 (La. 1979), the supreme court stated:
It is well established that statutes of limitation are remedial in nature and as such are generally accorded retroactive application. However, statutes of limitation, like any other procedural or remedial law, cannot consistently with state and federal constitutions apply retroactively to disturb a person of a pre-existing right. Nonetheless, a newly-created statute of limitation or one which shortens existing periods of limitation will not violate the constitutional prohibition against divesting a vested right provided it allows a reasonable time for those affected by the act to assert their rights. Moreover, the legislature is the judge of the reasonableness of the time and the courts will not interfere except where the time is so short as to amount to a denial of justice. (Citations omitted)
Here, the amending legislation was enacted eleven months before it became effective. The purpose of the delayed effective date was to provide advance notice to those who might be affected by the change and to afford parties an opportunity to take action in their case to preserve their rights before the abandonment period was decreased from five to three years. Baker v. LIGA , 99-479, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 152, 154; Matthews v. Fontenot, 99-0484 at p. 3, 745 So.2d at 693.
We find that the legislature provided a reasonable period following the enactment of the amendment to afford those litigants involved in pending lawsuits to take action therein in order to preserve their rights. Therefore, we hold that the shortened time period provided for in the amendment to article 561 may be applied to plaintiff's case, which was pending on the effective date of the amendment. Plaintiff failed to take any action for three years before July 1, 1998, causing the suit to become abandoned on that date. Accord Theisges v. Boudreaux, 99-1458 (La. 7/2/99), 747 So.2d 4; Bourgeois v. Veal, 99-0786 (La. 5/7/99), 740 So.2d 1291; Coe v. State of Louisiana, Health Care Authority, 32,635, _____ So.2d ______; Matthews v. Fontenot, 99-0484, 745 So.2d 691; Dempster v. Louisiana Health Services & Indemnity Company, 98-1112, 730 So.2d 524. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the suit on the basis of abandonment pursuant to article 561.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant.
AFFIRMED.
|