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Newborn v. Newborn6/29/2000
ion award for permanent partial disability arising out of injuries sustained during the marriage constituted marital property within the contemplation of FA section 8-201(e). The question arose after David Queen was injured on his job approximately six months before he and his wife (Dora) separated. Id. at 576. As a result of his injury, Mr. Queen received weekly workers' compensation benefits for about twenty-five months. Id. at 576. He then received a payment of $55,000 as a lump sum benefit payment for his permanent partial disability. Mr. Queen deposited the $55,000 in an account in his name alone. Id. The trial judge in the domestic relations case ruled that the entire $55,000 was marital property and, taking that into account, made a monetary award to Dora. Id. at 576-77.
The Court of Appeals held in Queen that under Maryland's workers' compensation law the award of permanent partial disability represented an amount "based on the loss of future earning capacity and not merely upon the loss of wages." Id. at 586. Chief Judge Robert Murphy said for the Queen Court:
e note that the award was received approximately one year before the couple divorced. We note also that the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to assist workers and their families, Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343 (1980), and that the Marital Property Act should be construed liberally to effect its broad remedial purpose. Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 64 (1982). Nonetheless, we hold that only the portion of the husband's award compensating for loss of earning capacity during the marriage is marital property subject to equitable distribution by the trial judge. Due to the personal nature of the injuries giving rise to a permanent partial disability award, we cannot conclude that the General Assembly intended a noninjured spouse to share in the compensation for the injured spouse's loss of future earning capacity representing a time period beyond the dissolution of the marriage. Because the record before us fails to disclose the information essential to computing the portion of the husband's award, if any, allocable as marital property, we shall remand the case to the trial court for additional fact-finding and disposition consistent with these principles. Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
This Court was presented with a case much like Queen in Lowery v. Lowery, 113 Md. App. 423 (1997), except for the fact that the injured spouse in Lowery received a workers' compensation settlement for injuries that occurred prior to his marriage. Id. at 427. After filing three separate workers' compensation claims, Mr. Lowery, the injured spouse, finally reached a settlement with the employer/insurer in April 1995. By virtue of the settlement, he received a lump sum of $7,500 and an annuity of $500 a month for life (or a minimum of twenty years), with a guaranty of a minimum of $120,000 payable to either him or his estate. Id. at 428. The agreement was silent, however, as to whether the purpose of the award was to compensate Mr. Lowery for lost wages, medical expenses, or otherwise. Id. One month later, in May 1995, Mrs. Lowery obtained a judgment of absolute divorce . Id. at 429. In Lowery, the trial court concluded that $44,000 of the settlement was marital property because it was compensation to the husband for loss of his earning capacity during the marriage. Id. at 429.
In Lowery, we interpreted Queen
as holding that the purpose of the benefits, rather than the timing of the accrual of the underlying claim or the award/settlement, is determinative in characterizing a workers' compensation settlement or award as marital or separate property. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
We noted that
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