Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services6/14/2000
statute, our inquiry normally will cease and the plain meaning of the statute will govern. See id. See also Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399, 726 A.2d 728, 733 (1999); Philip Elec. North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 216-17, 703 A.2d 150, 153 (1997); Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119, 668 A.2d 929, 931 (1995). We bear in mind, however, that the plain-meaning rule is elastic, rather than cast in stone. See Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). If persuasive evidence exists outside the plain text of the statue, we do not turn a blind eye to it. See Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514. We often look to the legislative history, an agency's interpretation of the statute, and other sources for a more complete understanding of what the General Assembly intended when it enacted particular legislation. See Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). In so doing, " e may also consider the particular problem or problems the legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain." Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Department of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 40, 522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987). This enables us to put the statute in controversy in its proper context and thereby avoid unreasonable or illogical results that defy common sense. See Huffman, 356 Md. at 628, 741 A.2d at 1091; Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 459 (1997); Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632.
"We should first attempt to ascertain [the legislature's] intent from the statutory language, reading pertinent parts of the legislative language together, giving effect to all of those parts if we can, and rendering no part of the law surplusage." Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 309 Md. at 39-40, 522 A.2d at 388. Our statutory construction analysis, therefore, requires an extensive restatement and integration of various sections of the PLA under Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 5-1001, et seq., and Maryland Code (1974, 1999 Repl. Vol.), Correctional Services Article (CSA), §§ 10-201, et seq.. Only after the statutory mosaic is pieced together, and placed in its proper context, can we gather a true picture of the scope of the PLA's exhaustion requirement as it may apply to the case sub judice. PLA § 5-1001 provides the definitions at issue:
(a) In general. - In this subtitle the following words have the meanings indicated.
(b) Administrative remedy. - (1) "Administrative remedy" means any procedure for review of a prisoner's complaint or grievance, including judicial review, if available, that is provided by the Department, the Division of Correction, or any county or other municipality or political subdivision, and results in a written determination or disposition.
(2) "Administrative remedy" includes a proceeding under Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article or Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the Correctional Services Article.
(c) Civil action. - (1) "Civil action" means a legal action seeking money damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or any appeal filed in any court in the State that relates to or involves a prisoner's conditions of confinement.
(2) "Civil action" includes:
(i) An appeal of an administrative remedy to any court;
(ii) A petition for mandamus against the prisoner's custodian, its officers or employees, or any official or employee of the Department;
(iii) Any tort claim against a custodian, the custodian's officers or employees, or any employee or official of the Department;
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|