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Cole v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company6/14/2000
entially, State Farm viewed the cause of Ms. Cole's death as independent of the use of the covered vehicle.
Petitioner then filed a complaint in the District Court on 6 March 1997 alleging that Respondent breached the insurance contract by refusing to pay the accidental death benefit. He sought $10,000 in damages. Respondent requested a jury trial on 29 May 1997 and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court on 12 June 1997.
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on 18 March 1998. In his motion, Petitioner pointed out that the parties agreed that Ms. Cole's insurance policy was in effect at the time of the incident and that she was seated in her van, with the engine running, when she was shot fatally. He asserted that the only issue in the case was whether his wife's death was caused by an "accident" within the meaning of the term in the relevant policy coverage. Petitioner argued that the incident which caused his wife's death was an "accident" because she did not anticipate that she would be murdered while waiting in the van in Mr. Cave's driveway.
On 16 April 1998, Respondent filed an opposition to the Petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Respondent admitted that when Ms. Cole was murdered her van was insured under a valid State Farm policy and that she was an occupant of the insured vehicle at the time Mr. Cave shot her. Respondent contended, however, that Maryland case law requires a casual connection between the use of a vehicle and the claimant's death before a court may declare liability under the policy. Respondent asserted that there was no connection between Mr. Cave's violent acts and Ms. Cole's use of her van. The fact that she was seated in her van when she was murdered, Respondent suggested, is not enough to impose liability under the policy.
In an order dated 21 May 1998, the Circuit Court denied Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, holding that:
"the word "accident" as used in Section V of the applicable insurance policy . . . is defined in the typical understanding of the word and is not given the liberal definition provided under the uninsured motorist coverage, and because the facts of this case do not support the argument that Sharyn Kae Cole's death was "caused by accident" as stated in Section V of the applicable policy.
Petitioner filed post-judgment motions, within ten days of the docketing of the order granting summary judgment, pursuant to Md. Rule 2-534. The Circuit Court denied those motions on 17 July 1998.
Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on 4 August 1998. The intermediate appellate court set forth two alterative reasons for its affirmance of the Circuit Court's judgment. Relying on an excerpt from DeJarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 475 A.2d 454 (1984), the court determined a claimant may not recover under an automobile liability insurance policy when the injury inflicted upon the claimant while situated in an automobile was caused by force or conduct not related to the use of the automobile. The court also explained, as an alternative basis, that "whether or not an injury is accidental has been held determinable by the state of mind of the person who inflicts the injury, rather than by that of the injured person," quoting from Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254 Md. 120, 127-28, 254 A.2d 658, 663 (1969). Viewing the 17 September 1994 incident from Mr. Cave's perspective, rather than Ms. Cole's, the court concluded that Ms. Cole's death "in no way qualified as an `accident' within the context of the automobile insurance policy."
ANALYSIS
I.
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