 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Niles-Robinson v. Brigham and Women's Hospital Inc.6/29/1999
Suffolk.
December 10, 1998
Workers' Compensation Act, Injuries to which act applies, Exclusivity provision, Decision of Industrial Accident Reviewing Board. Collateral Estoppel. Res Judicata. Judicial Estoppel.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 2, 1996.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Maria I. Lopez, J., and entry of judgment was ordered by Charles T. Spurlock, J.
The plaintiff, Claudette Niles-Robinson, sustained serious physical and mental injuries (principally multiple chemical sensitivity, or MCS) as a consequence of faulty ventilation and other environmental problems to which she and many other employees of defendant Brigham and Women's Hospital, Inc. (hospital), were exposed during construction activities at the hospital in 1995. She filed for and, after being found disabled by the Department of Industrial Accidents (department), was awarded worker 's compensation benefits on account of her injuries. Thereafter, she commenced a multicount tort action against the hospital for monetary damages claimed to have resulted from those injuries.
The hospital moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974). The hospital asserted that the worker 's compensation act was the plaintiff's exclusive remedy for the claimed workplace injuries, by virtue of G. L. c. 152, Sect. 24, and that her claiming and accepting worker 's compensation benefits had constituted a release of all the asserted claims, pursuant to G. L. c. 152, Sect. 23. A Judge of the Superior Court agreed with those contentions and allowed the motion to dismiss.
On appeal from the dismissal, the plaintiff asserts that she is not barred by the worker 's compensation act because her MCS is not a compensable "personal injury" within the meaning of the act. She relies on the act's definition of the term: "'Personal injury' includes infectious or contagious diseases if the nature of the employment is such that the hazard of contracting such diseases by an employee is inherent in the employment." G. L. c. 152, Sect. 1(7A), as inserted by St. 1941, c. 437. Since the risk of contracting MCS is not inherent in her employment at the hospital (so she alleges in her complaint), she should be entitled to proceed with her tort claims.
The parties devote substantial portions of their briefs to the meaning and scope of the term "personal injury," as partially elucidated by the purpose and historical development of G. L. c. 152 and the relatively few judicial decisions that have involved the term's meaning. That interesting issue need not detain us, however, because of the procedural context of this controversy. The outcome-determinative factors here are that the plaintiff filed a claim for worker 's compensation benefits with the department for the very injuries set forth in her complaint; those injuries were determined to be compensable injuries under G. L. c. 152; she was determined to be disabled for purposes of receiving the claimed worker 's compensation benefits; she was awarded and has received payment of such benefits for those injuries; and no appeal from that award decision was taken. In light of those facts, the plaintiff is precluded from asserting her purported common law right of action, for two reasons.
1. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion
The most pertinent issue in this case -- whether the plaintiff's MCS is a compensable injury under G. L. c. 152 -- was determined by the prior final adjudication at the department. The plaintiff there maintained that she had suffered a compensable injury for which she was entitled to worker's compensa
Page 1 2 Massachusetts Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|