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Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corp.6/9/1999
ory failed to comply with these provisions, the trial court erred in not granting the defendant hospital's motions for summary disposition on this matter.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. We partially reverse the judgment of the trial court in Gregory v Heritage Hosp and remand the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Weaver, C.J., and Taylor, and Young, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.
Corrigan, J., concurred with Brickley, J., in Gregory, but took no part in the decision of Dorris.
Kelly, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although I concur with sections I, III, and IV of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from section II. In holding that the names of unknown patients are protected by the physician-patient privilege, the majority has disregarded the language of the statute, unduly broadening the privilege.
Michigan provides for expansive discovery, permitting parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged that is relevant to the subject matter involved in a pending action. MCR 2.302(B)(1). Among the exceptions recognized by the Legislature is the physician patient privilege, which states, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information that the person has acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the information was necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a physician, or to do any act for the patient as a surgeon. [MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157 (emphasis added).]
The primary goal of interpreting a statutory provision, like the physician-patient privilege, is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). To accomplish this goal, we presume that every word in the statute has meaning and avoid any construction that renders any part surplusage. Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 (1992).
The statutory section cited here provides that information falls within the purview of the physician-patient privilege only if it was "necessary" to enable a physician "to prescribe" for a patient. MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157. Nevertheless, the majority disregards this limitation, rendering the language of the statute surplusage.
The majority chooses to rely on dicta from Schechet v Kesten, 372 Mich 346, 351; 126 NW2d 718 (1964):
[The statute] protects, "within the veil of privilege," whatever in order to enable the physician to prescribe, "was disclosed to any of his senses, and which in any way was brought to his knowledge for that purpose." Such veil of privilege is the patient's right. It prohibits the physician from disclosing, in the course of any action wherein his patient or patients are not involved and do not consent, even the names of such noninvolved[ ] patients. [Citation omitted.]
The majority here concludes that the name of a "noninvolved patient" is protected by the privilege. However, it fails to explain how the name is necessary to enable someone to prescribe for the patient as a physician. MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157. By concluding that patient names are within the purview of the privilege, this Court has ignored several fundamental principles of statutory construction: that every word should be given meaning, if possible, and that any construction that renders part of a statute surplusage should be avoided. Altman, supra at 635.
Consisten
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