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Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corp.6/9/1999
Dr. Schechet sought the names and treatment histories regarding those patients whom Dr. Kesten accused Dr. Schechet of failing to appropriately treat in his report to the committee. This Court reversed the trial court's order of disclosure, stating:
Such veil of privilege is the patient's right. It prohibits the physician from disclosing, in the course of any action wherein his patient or patients are not involved and do not consent, even the names of such noninvolved patients. [372 Mich 351.]
In its decision in Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hosp, the Court of Appeals panel relied upon Schechet in finding that the names of nonparty patients were protected by the physician-patient privilege and not subject to disclosure. Plaintiff Dorris argues that the panel committed error requiring reversal by wrongfully relying on this dicta from Schechet. Rather, Dorris argues that this Court should follow Porter v Michigan Osteopathic Hosp Ass'n, Inc, 170 Mich App 619; 428 NW2d 719 (1988). In Porter, the plaintiff sought disclosure of the names and information regarding two other patients who allegedly raped her while she was a patient at the Michigan Osteopathic Hospital. In upholding the trial court's order of disclosure, the Court of Appeals found that disclosure of the names and addresses of unknown patients who were suspected as assailants did not require disclosure of information necessary for treatment or diagnosis pursuant to MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the names and addresses of the unknown patients were discoverable.
The Dorris panel noted the Porter dissent that found that the physician-patient privilege "statute has not been construed as limited to information solely necessary for treatment." Porter, 170 Mich App 627 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting). However, the Dorris panel noted that in Porter there were stronger policy reasons for disclosure, because the plaintiff was seeking the name of the patients who allegedly attacked her, whereas, in Dorris, the plaintiff was only seeking the name of the patient who may have overheard a conversation between the plaintiff and medical personnel.
Gregory argues that her case presents stronger reasons for disclosure than those argued in Dorris and Porter. She argues that in the present case, the information requested is required to identify a party to the litigation. She would have this Court hold that, unless the information is necessary for the purpose of examination, diagnosis, or treatment, it is discoverable. She further argues that the identity of the unknown patient is not protected by the physician-patient privilege.
This state has a strong historical commitment to a far-reaching, open, and effective discovery practice. Daniels v Allen Industries, Inc, 391 Mich 398, 403; 216 NW2d 762 (1974). " he Michigan Court Rules of 1985 in no way acted to restrict discovery or to modify this commitment to open discovery." Domako, 438 Mich 359. MCR 2.302(B)(1), which governs the scope of permissible discovery, provides:
In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of another party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of a discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evide
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