 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Binkowski v. State6/24/1999
ommon definitions. See Afanador, supra, 134 N.J. at 171. Hence, the terms are not facially vague.
Nor is the statute vague because its enforcement depends on the subjective feeling of the particular hunter involved; nor does it effectively grant the hunter the discretion, without any defining standard, the right to decide whether the conduct should be proscribed. See Coates, supra, 402 U.S. at 615-16, 91 S. Ct. at 1689, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 217-18; see also Hill, supra, 482 U.S. at 465 n.15, 107 S. Ct. at 2512 n.15, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 414 n.15. To the contrary, the proscribed conduct is not based on the hunter's personal predilections, but on the actor's conduct and his or her specific intent. In other words, for a person to be found to have violated the statute, the State must prove that the person "block , obstruct or imped , or attempt to block, obstruct, or impede," the hunter with "the purpose of hindering or preventing the lawful taking of wildlife." N.J.S.A. 23:7A-2a (emphasis added). By imposing a specific-intent requirement on subsection (a), the Legislature sufficiently clarified the conduct proscribed. See Mortimer, supra 135 N.J. at 536.
Similarly, the language in subsection (g) is clarified by the requirement that the State must demonstrate that the person "mak or attempt to make loud noises or gestures" do so "in order to disturb, alarm, drive, attract, or affect the behavior of wildlife or disturb, alarm, disrupt, or annoy a person lawfully taking wildlife." N.J.S.A. 23:7A-2g (emphasis added). To the extent there is ambiguity in the term "loud noises" or "gestures," here, too, the specific intent requirement serves to illuminate the potentially vague phrases. As for the purposive terms themselves, e.g., "alarm" or "annoy," these are sufficiently clear to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of the type of mental culpability needed. See State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579-81 (1997).
Lastly, the catchall phrase, "any other similar action or activity," contained in subsection (g), is not impermissibly vague because we avoid a constitutional challenge by applying the ejusdem generis principle of statutory construction. We assume that the Legislature did not intend to expose a person to liability under subsection (g) for engaging in conduct unless the conduct was similar to that which is proscribed in the statute. See id. at 584. In so construing the language of the catchall provision, we perceive no constitutional infirmity here. In short, we are satisfied that the Hunter Harassment Statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face.
IV.
To the extent plaintiffs have raised additional constitutional arguments based on equal protection and free exercise of religion grounds, or otherwise, for the reasons already discussed, we reject them as entirely without merit, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), adding only these brief comments. We reject the equal protection argument that the statute impermissibly endorses the viewpoint of hunters at the expense of protesters for the reasons previously stated. On its face, the Hunter Harassment Statute regulates only conduct. As for plaintiff Binkowski's free exercise of religion claim, she failed to support that claim by competent evidential material describing her purported religious beliefs. See R. 4:46-2; see also R. 1:6-6.
Affirmed.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 New Jersey Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|