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State v. Mann6/6/2000
td., 111 N.M. 566, 570, 807 P.2d 750, 754 (Ct. App. 1991) (declining to review affidavits pertaining to intrajuror communications).
In deference to these concerns, we have disallowed inquiries into matters intrinsic and allowed inquiry only into matters extrinsic to the deliberative process. See, e.g., Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2000; Hurst, 111 N.M. at 569, 807 P.2d at 753; see also Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1302 (Del. 1991) (discussing explicit distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic influences on jury deliberations). For this reason, it was Defendant's threshold burden below to show that something extrinsic to the trial process made its way into the jury's deliberation of the charges against him. This burden is not discharged merely by allegation; rather, Defendant must make an affirmative showing that some extraneous influence came to bear on the jury's deliberations. See State v. Sena, 105 N.M. 686, 688, 736 P.2d 491, 493 (1987) (ending inquiry upon defendant's failure to adduce sufficient evidence of juror misconduct). Only upon his discharge of this burden will a court make any inquiry as to what prejudice this impermissible influence worked.
Did Juror No. 7 introduce an extraneous influence upon deliberations?
This appeal raises a pair of related, but subtly distinct questions. First, does Juror No. 7's status as an engineer, with a general technical background, render his active participation in deliberations an extraneous influence on the process? And second, did the substance of Juror No. 7's statements to his fellow jurors introduce an extraneous influence upon deliberations?
1. Juror No. 7's professional status.
Defendant knew of Juror No. 7's professional status and technical background prior to selecting him to serve on the jury. Indeed, the district court noted the "extensive voir dire" in issuing his ruling on Defendant's motion. During the voir dire, Juror No. 7 disclosed that he was an engineer and that he worked for Sandia National Laboratories. Furthermore, in his answers to the pre-voir dire questionnaire, he disclosed this technical background and training. Defendant made no objection-either for cause or peremptory-in light of these disclosures. Perhaps, Defendant overlooked the potential significance of what Juror No. 7 could bring to deliberations, or perhaps, he believed that someone of Juror No. 7's training could benefit his case; indeed, as Juror No. 7 stated during his in camera interview:
ased on what I heard from talking with the defense attorneys during this interim after the trial, the feedback I got from them is that yeah, Mr. Twohig in fact wanted me on the jury because I guess he thought that I was going to be the guy that would listen to his expert and then somewhat rubber stamp it and say, "Oh, yes, this is all correct, etc. etc."
We determine that Juror No. 7's professional training, without more, could not constitute an extraneous influence; indeed, Defendant's knowing acceptance of Juror No. 7 rendered his specialized training-as a general matter-intrinsic to the jury and the trial as a whole. Cf. United States v. Costa, 890 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir. 1989) (commenting in analogous context that " ny other rule would allow defendants to sandbag the court by remaining silent and gambling on a favorable verdict, knowing that if the verdict went against them, they could always obtain a new trial by later raising the issue of juror misconduct").
The case of Richards v. Overlake Hospital Medical Center, 796 P.2d 737 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) is largely indistinguishable from the appeal at bar. In that case, a plaintiff, claiming medical malpractice upon bi
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