 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Mann6/6/2000
rth defects in her new-born child, sought to reverse an adverse jury verdict upon claimed juror misconduct. See id. at 740. The plaintiff alleged that one of the jurors, an individual with medical expertise, had argued to her fellow jurors that plaintiff's medical records, which had been admitted into evidence, indicated a viral infection. See id. at 742. The plaintiff further alleged that this juror stated during deliberations her opinion that this infection, rather than any malpractice, is what likely caused the subject birth defects. See id. The Washington Court of Appeals found no misconduct, stating:
The evidence of a viral infection at the 16- to 20-week stage of the pregnancy was before the jury from the testimony of one of the doctors and in the medical reports. Juror Geisler's background was known to the parties at the time of voir dire and her "medical" knowledge was something she naturally brought in with her to the deliberations, and this was known by all the parties after voir dire. The medical records were introduced into evidence and sent to the jury room with the jury for its use in the deliberations. There was no extrinsic evidence brought into the case and thus there was no misconduct. Id. at 743.
Implicit in this conclusion, the court considered the juror's disclosed and knowingly-accepted specialized knowledge to be intrinsic to the process.
In the present case, Defendant knew of Juror No. 7's training and background, "something naturally brought in with to the deliberations." Id. Furthermore, Dr. Watts' testimony-that is, his testimony adduced on both direct and cross-examinations-was before the jury. The probability of events occurring as Defendant posited was fundamental to the case; evidence upon it had been admitted and amply argued. See State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 733, 819 P.2d 673, 683 (1991) (concluding juror experiment with evidence was not improper when "the background information was all properly before the jury"). Upon this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Juror No. 7's training and profession did not constitute an extrinsic influence upon the deliberative process.
As the Supreme Court of California has recognized, " t is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or employment background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long as the opinion is based on the evidence at trial." In re Malone, 911 P.2d 468, 486 (Cal. 1996); accord Titus v. State, 963 P.2d 258, 262 (Alaska 1998) (" urors can make intelligent decisions only by drawing upon their accumulated background knowledge and experience." (Internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 37, 226 P. 1099, 1100 (1924) ("In deciding every case, jurors must necessarily take into consideration their knowledge and impressions founded upon experience in their everyday walks of life, and the fact that these things affect them in reaching their verdict cannot be reversible error.").
Similarly, we have consistently held that jurors are expected to rely upon their life experiences and background during deliberations. See, e.g., Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682 (" he jury must be allowed latitude to evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate."). "Specialized knowledge"-of which professional training and educational background are certainly species-is a form of "life experience" and "background." See In re Malone, 911 P.2d at 486 ("Jurors' views of the evidence, moreover, are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including their education and professional work."); cf. Titus, 963 P.2d at 262-64 (noting "familiarity with x-ray techn
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 New Mexico Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|