 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Mann6/6/2000
ology" as a type of general knowledge and discussing distinction between general and specific knowledge); Wagner v. Doulton, 169 Cal. Rptr. 550, 552 (Ct. App. 1980) (concluding engineer-juror's taking it upon himself to draft diagram based upon evidence at trial did not introduce extrinsic influence upon deliberations).
Furthermore, we believe that to hold otherwise-that is, to regulate separately the participation of jurors with specialized knowledge-would result in an unprecedented and unnecessary intrusion upon the deliberative process of juries, a curtailment of the constitutional right and duty every citizen has to serve on a jury, and establish a rule that would be nearly impossible to enforce without pro forma, post- verdict inquiry into the substance of each jury's deliberations. Cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (" t is an impossible standard to require that tribunal to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from external factors."); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 37, 226 P. at 1100 (" urors without possessing such knowledge and impressions could not be had."). We see no purpose served by such a formulaic "dumbing down" of our juries, that is, by treating as inherently suspect a juror's known possession of professional knowledge. See Robert D. Myers, Complex Scientific Evidence and the Jury, Judicature, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 150, 154 (" awyers who believe in `dumbing down' juries should . . . recognize the important role of jurors as fact finders and decision makers.").
Rather than relying solely upon an individual juror's professional status or training, courts have found misconduct only upon a showing that something extra-record corrupted jury deliberations, that is, the introduction of extra-judicial facts, authority, or issues. For example, in State v. Thacker, 596 P.2d 508, 508 (Nev. 1979) (per curiam), relied upon by our Supreme Court in Sacoman and by Defendant in this case, two defendants appealed their convictions for grand larceny of two calves and were granted, upon their initial motion, a new trial. See id. at 509. Their theory of defense was essentially one of mistaken identification; that is, they argued that the cattle the authorities had seized from them were not the animals that had been stolen. See id. To support this contention, they argued that the seized cattle were smaller than the stolen cattle. The trial court admitted several photographs into evidence related to this point and permitted the jury to examine the impounded cattle. See id. No evidence, however, was "presented at trial concerning the weight of the cattle or what the animals had been fed during the impound." Id. After the jury convicted, the defendants alleged juror misconduct.
As it turned out, one of the jurors-indeed, the jury foreman-was the "superintendent in charge of cattle operations at Nevada Nile Ranch," the facility where the allegedly stolen calves had been impounded upon their recovery. Id. This cattleman-juror, despite the lack of evidence on the subject, took it upon himself, in reliance upon his knowledge of livestock and feed, to "compute an estimate of what he thought the calves weighed . . . and gave his information to the other jurors." Id. Upon this introduction of fact not in evidence, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial.
This holding is consistent with the Supreme Court of California's opinion in In re Malone, noted above. Therein, the court denied the habeas corpus petition of a defendant convicted and sentenced to death, in part upon polygraph evidence, on a charge of first-degree murder. See In re Malone, 911 P.2d at 472-74. The defendant alleged juror misconduc
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 New Mexico Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|