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Kidd v. Center Point Plaza6/17/1999
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
On January 1, 1995, appellant, Candace Kidd, traveled to appellee, Center Point Plaza Shopping Center, to return some items to appellee, Value City Department Store. As appellant attempted to enter Value City, she walked up a handicap ramp and fell. Appellant sustained injuries to her lower back, left ankle, knee, wrist and shoulder. On December 30, 1996, appellant filed a complaint against appellees and Regina Stuckey, general partner of the Plaza. On June 19, 1998, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. By memorandum of decision filed September 14, 1998 and judgment entry filed October 1, 1998, the trial court granted said motion and dismissed appellant's complaint. Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for consideration.
Assignments of error are as follows:
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GRANTING APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND IS IN VIOLATION OF OHIO RULE 56.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GRANTING APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRIOR TO THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT A PARTY MUST FILE AN AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO OHIO CIVIL RULE 56(F) FOR A COURT TO DELAY OR DENY A SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULING BECAUSE DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETE CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
I., IV.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellees. We disagree. Summary judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of Civ.R. 56. Said rule has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 448: Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one Conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that Conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274.
As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we must stand in the shoes of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same standard and evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35. Appellees do not dispute that appellant was a business invitee and they owed her a duty of ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition: A shopkeeper owes business invitees a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition so that its customers are not unnecessarily and unreasonably exposed to danger. See Campbell v. Hughes Provision Co. (1950), 153 Ohio St. 9 [41 O.O. 107]. A shopkeeper is not, however, an insurer of the customer's safety. Further, a shopkeeper is under no duty to protect business invitees from dangers 'which are known to such invitee or are so obvious and apparent to such invitee that he may reasonably be expected to discover them to protect himself against them.' Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45 [42 O.O.2d 96], paragraph one of the syllabus.
Paschall v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 203-204.
In Kresge Co.
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