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Peterson v. West American Insurance Co.6/1/1999
ipt of any such notice the department shall make a reasonable effort to notify the person that his certificate of registration has been suspended and shall recover the certificate from such person and the motor vehicle registration plates from the vehicles concerned. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-40 (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
The provision's first sentence explicitly limits its scope to insurers. The provision's emphasized portion implicitly assumes the insured lacks notice of a policy's cancellation until the Highway Department notifies the insured, thus implying the insurer, rather than the insured, cancelled the policy. Therefore, we find this provision's applicability also is limited to instances where the insurer, rather than the insured, cancels the policy.
Other statutory provisions imposing notice requirements when the insurer cancels a policy, but not where the insured cancels the policy, buttress our Conclusion. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 332, 335, 295 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1982) (noting that " n construing a statute, it is proper to consider legislation dealing with the same subject matter"). For example, § 38-77-120 provides:
(a) No cancellation or refusal to renew by an insurer of a policy of automobile insurance is effective unless the insurer delivers or mails, to the named insured at the address shown in the policy, a written notice of the cancellation or refusal to renew.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply if the:
(2) named insured has demonstrated by some overt action to the insurer or its agent that he expressly intends that the policy be canceled or that it not be renewed. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-120 (Supp 1998).
This provision absolves an insurer's responsibility to issue notice when the insured cancels or refuses to renew a policy, in contrast to when the insurer takes such action and, thus, illustrates the different duties arising when the insured cancels a policy as opposed to when the insurer cancels the policy.
Therefore, we hold Walker's voluntary cancellation of her policy absolved West American's notice responsibilities under §§ 56-10-40 and 56-10-240. Because Peterson, as Walker's assignee, assumes the same position as Walker, Peterson is also precluded from claiming West American failed to give proper notice. Singletary v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 316 S.C. 199, 201-02, 447 S.E.2d 869, 870 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and can claim no higher rights than the assignor possessed at the time of the assignment).
B. No continuation of policy in the absence of notice of cancellation.
Even assuming §§ 56-10-40 and 56-10-240 applied, Peterson's claim is without merit because West American's failure to comply with the notice requirements does not effectively continue the policy.
If § 56-10-40 or § 56-10-240 do apply, West American violated these provisions by failing to properly notify the Highway Department that Walker's policy terminated. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-10-40 & -240 (Supp. 1998); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Security Fire & Indem. Co. 248 S.C. 307, 313-14, 149 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1966) ("Statutory provisions requiring notice for cancellation or termination of compulsory motor vehicle insurance are mandatory, must be strictly followed to effect a cancellation or termination of the policy, and must be construed so as to effect the statutory purpose of providing protection to the general public.").
However, even if required, West American's failure to properly notify the Highway Department would not continue the policy in effe
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