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Sisters of Providence in Washington v. A.A. Pain Clinic12/19/2003
referrals was corroborated by Providence employees. From this testimony, it would be reasonable for a juror to conclude that Chandler was seeking reasonable and legitimate business opportunities which were at least in part frustrated by defendants' actions. Furthermore, other testimony, such as that from one of Chandler's former patients, who described her frustrated attempts to have Chandler contacted, helped demonstrate that there was a class of third parties being affected by the interference. Coupled with the testimony regarding patient S.H., the evidence is sufficient; a reasonable juror could have resolved this element in favor of plaintiffs.
To satisfy the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, Chandler and Borrello also had to demonstrate that defendants were responsible for causing any prospective business relationship not to materialize.
Contrary to the Group's suggestions that Chandler and Borrello only provided self-serving testimony, other evidence exists. Two pieces of evidence implicate the Group by demonstrating a policy bent on centralizing the referral process to insure that only Chandler's former patients would see him. A memo to Providence nursing and supervisors staff stated:
(1) All orders for Pain Management will be referred to [the Group] pain MD by the nurse or health unit coordinator. . . .
(2) [The Group] pain doctor will determine if the patient has previously been seen by Dr. Chandler, and, if so, will inform him that his patient is here.
Providence's pain service clinician verified that this policy was in place throughout the entirety of the exclusive contract. There also exists evidence suggesting that this policy resulted in occasions where Borrello and Chandler were actually prevented from seeing their own patients. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to decide in favor of Chandler and Borrello.
As discussed above, the superior court correctly instructed the jury that plaintiffs had the burden of proving the Group's actions were not privileged. The Group now argues that Chandler and Borrello were not able to satisfy that burden because no evidence demonstrated the Group was motivated by spite, malice, or some other improper objective. We disagree.
Plaintiffs presented evidence that Dr. Norman held a personal grudge against Chandler based on a prior business association and lawsuit. While Norman disputed this inference, whether there was a grudge and, if so, its impact were jury questions. Other evidence was presented that members of the Group felt Borrello, as an associate of Chandler, was "tainted." One witness testified to overhearing Norman saying that "there was no way he was going to credential" Borrello because he "didn't want to give Chandler any extra help at Providence Hospital." Such evidence, coupled with the expressed intentions of Norman and other Group members to drive Chandler out of the hospital and out of business could have led a reasonable juror to decide in favor of defendants as to the privilege element.
The Group next argues that Chandler and Borrello's damages awards for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage were excessive because they exceed plaintiffs' own expert's estimates. The Group claims this expert's only testimony with regard to this claim referenced injuries stemming from lost referrals, estimating damages at $136,212 for Borrello and $116,256 for Chandler. But the jury eventually awarded $365,600 to Borrello and $292,480 to Chandler.
The Group concedes having not addressed this point at the j.n.o.v. stage. Thus it is only entitled to relief if we find plain erro
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