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Sisters of Providence in Washington v. A.A. Pain Clinic12/19/2003
r "so substantial as to result in injustice."
The superior court found that "there an evidentiary basis for the award of damages to [Dr. Chandler] and to Dr. Borrello for the tort of intentional interference with prospective advantage." We agree. The expert's testimony encompassed more than just referrals, also referencing "Medicare dumping" and restrictions on the doctors' practices, estimating additional damages exceeding the amount awarded. It would be reasonable for a juror to include these practices within the scope of the tort of intentional interference with prospective advantage, and to allow them to do so was not plain error.
Appeal Issue 3 Was the evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of Chandler's claim of restraint of trade?
Alaska Statute 45.50.562 provides that " very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful." When appropriate, this court is guided by federal Sherman Act cases in construing Alaska antitrust law.
In order to establish a prima facie case under Alaska's restraint of trade statute, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the existence of an agreement or conspiracy among two or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) intent on the part of those persons or entities to harm or restrain competition; and (3) the agreement or conspiracy actually injured competition in the relevant market.
Unless a case involves a per se violation, most jurisdictions, including ours, utilize a "rule of reason" test to determine whether or not competition has actually been damaged:
"Under the rule of reason test ` fter the claimant has proven that the conspiracy harmed competition, the fact finder must balance the restraint and any justifications or pro-competitive effects of the restraint in order to determine whether the restraint is unreasonable.' "
After the presentation of plaintiffs' evidence, the defense moved for directed verdict on the antitrust claim, attacking plaintiffs' case on several grounds. This motion was denied. After a jury verdict against both Providence and the Group on the antitrust claim, the defense again raised all their arguments in a motion for j.n.o.v., which was subsequently denied. Providence and the Group renew their arguments on appeal. In addition, they argue that Chandler failed to establish cognizable antitrust injury and antitrust standing.
Providence and the Group contend that "the critical question is where the consumer of chronic pain services can reasonably turn for alternative care" and conclude that Chandler, in only describing "out-of-office" procedures performed at Providence, has not answered this question. They cite authority holding that one hospital is not a relevant market unless it "is the only one serving a particular area or offers unique set of services." They claim Chandler provided no other information such as prices or patient volumes about other market participants, especially pain clinics, and conclude that the jury had no framework for deciding whether competition had been impaired.
Appellants' representation of the evidence is deficient. The evidence was replete with references to the pain services market, which for the relevant periods of time only contained two to four providers and did not extend outside the Anchorage area. Though this evidence comes from self-interested parties, that does not mean that it is presumptively worthless. Hard data is not necessarily required in antitrust cases. In Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hospital, a case heavily relied on by this court in interpreting our antitrust statute, the Ninth Circuit stated that
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