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Pearson v. Brooks12/5/2003
Annie Pearson appeals from the trial court's order dismissing, on the basis of a statute-of-limitations defense, her complaint against Glenn Brooks and Michael Black seeking damages for a job-related injury. We affirm.
Pearson was employed initially in the quality assurance and inspection department at Perdue Farms, Inc., a company operating a chicken-processing plant in Dothan. Subsequently, Pearson was transferred to the sanitation department; Brooks was the superintendent of the sanitation department, and Black was Pearson's immediate supervisor. Pearson was responsible for cleaning the "kill floor," where many of the machines used to prepare the chickens for sale and distribution were located. Pearson's cleaning routine required her to spray the machines with a high-pressure hose to remove the chicken remains. On November 17, 1999, while Pearson was cleaning the kill floor, she slipped in the chicken remains. In an attempt to break her fall, Pearson held her hands in front of her. Pearson fell into a "neck-skinning" machine, a machine that removed the skin from the chickens' necks. Pearson's right index finger was amputated when it became entangled in the machine. Apparently, the guard mechanism that would have prevented the blade of the machine from cutting was not in place at the time of Pearson's accident.
On October 17, 2001, one month before the statutory limitations period would have run on her claims, Pearson sued Perdue Farms, Inc.; Kurt Andrews, the plant manager; Brian Hughes, the plant safety director; and several of her co-employees -- Mike Harp, Dave Jones, and Dennis Widgons -- who were involved in the direct maintenance and supervision of the neck-skinning machine. Pearson did not name Brooks and Black, also co-employees, in the original complaint. The complaint alleged negligence and wantonness in the maintenance, repair, and upkeep of the neck-skinning machine, as well as the failure to ensure the safety of the machine. Pursuant to Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., Pearson alleged claims against fictitiously named defendants who were either "that person, corporation or other legal entity who or which designed the machine, which is the subject matter of this lawsuit"; "that person, corporation, or other legal entity who had responsibility for maintenance or repair of the machine which is the subject matter of this lawsuit"; or "that person, corporation, or other legal entity whose negligence, wantonness, recklessness, willfulness or other wrongful conduct caused the injury to Plaintiffs ."
Pearson began the discovery process with the named defendants. Pearson claims that at the August 20, 2002, deposition of Hughes she became privy to an accident investigation report related to her injury, which Hughes had prepared. Hughes stated in the report that Pearson's accident was caused by the "lack of control and supervision by the Sanitation Hourly Supervisor [Black] and Sanitation Superintendent [Brooks]." On August 30, 2002, Pearson amended her complaint to substitute Brooks and Black for two of the fictitiously named parties. Brooks and Black moved to dismiss Pearson's complaint, arguing that Pearson's claims against them were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Brooks and Black from the action. The trial court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Pearson appeals.
Pearson argues that her complaint was properly amended to add Brooks and Black as defendants pursuant to Rule 9(h), which allows a plaintiff to designate opposing parties by using a fictitious name:
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in the party's pleading, th
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