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Pearson v. Brooks12/5/2003
e opposing party may be designated by any name, and when that party's true name is discovered, the process and all pleadings and proceedings in the action may be amended by substituting the true name."
Further, Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that " n amendment of a pleading relates back to the original date of the pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h)." Pearson claims that Brooks and Black were properly named as fictitious parties because when she filed her original complaint, Pearson knew the names of the two men but she was not aware of any facts that would support a claim against them. She argues that her claims against Brooks and Black, therefore, relate back to the time of the commencement of the action, one month before the running of the applicable statutory limitations period. Brooks and Black argue that, based on her knowledge of their job titles and duties, Pearson was not ignorant of the name of an opposing party and was not excused from failing to sue Brooks and Black by their true names in the original complaint.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that Pearson could not have reasonably been ignorant of the identities of Brooks and Black. At her deposition, Pearson testified that she had known for over three or four years that Brooks was the superintendent of the sanitation department and that Brooks had personally trained her to clean the machines:
"Q. Tell me this. Tell me what you remember that Glenn [Brooks] trained you about?
"A. When he brought me in, he showed me how to -- how to do the machinery, how to clean them and wash them down and everything like that. ...
"Q. And which machinery did he show you how to clean?
"A. I did -- It was the bird wash and -- Let me see. It was two bird wash. Then it was two -- The other one I can't recall. It was two more and then it was the one, the neck skinner."
(Emphasis added.) Pearson also testified that Black was her immediate supervisor in the sanitation department and that he instructed the employees regarding the safety procedures in the plant:
"Q. I mean, you had safety meetings periodically when you were employed with Perdue [Farms]; is that correct?
"A. Yes. We have safety meetings.
"Q. And usually, those were conducted by the lead person or someone like Michael Black ...; is that correct?
"A. Correct.
"Q. And Michael Black was involved with plant safety ...; is that right?
"A. That's correct. ...
"Q. Now, we were talking about these safety meetings that you would attend as an employee at Perdue [Farms]. And do you remember specifically that you went to meetings with Michael Black where he was teaching employees like yourself about certain safety in the plant?
"A. Yes."
It is apparent from Pearson's testimony that she knew Brooks's and Black's identities as well as their duties regarding plant safety and the safe operation and cleaning of the plant's machinery. These two men were also her department supervisor and her immediate supervisor. It would be unreasonable to believe that Pearson was ignorant of Brooks's and Black's identities as required to proceed under the fictitious-party practice allowed by Rule 9(h).
Pearson further argues that although she may have known Brooks's and Black's identities at the time she filed her complaint, she did not know that Brooks and Black were the parties that she intended to sue. Pearson cites Dannelley v. Guarino, 472 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 1985), as authority for this argument. In Dann
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