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Howard v. City of Atmore12/12/2003
its terms, extends state-agent immunity to peace officers performing discretionary functions within the line and scope of their law-enforcement duties." Moore v. Crocker, 852 So. 2d 89, 90 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis added).
In Ex parte Cranman, supra, this Court "restated the law of state-agent immunity in Alabama." Moore, 852 So. 2d at 90. Since Cranman, we analyze immunity issues in terms of "State-agent" immunity, rather than "under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions." Ex parte Hudson, [Ms. 1011148, March 14, 2003] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2003). See also Giambrone v. Douglas, [Ms. 1020234, August 1, 2003] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 134 n.1 (Ala. 2002). Thus, we will address the applicability of peace-officer immunity under the principles set forth in Cranman. See Moore, supra; Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244 (Ala. 2000).
A. Officer Bryars
Howard's claims against Officer Bryars are based on allegations that Officer Bryars "negligently or wantonly failed to implement reasonable precautionary measures, including, but not limited to, the Atmore Police Department's Standard Operating Procedures, to prevent [Bowens] from committing suicide." Howard's brief in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment.
As a threshold matter, Howard contends that Officer Bryars is not entitled to peace-officer immunity, because, she argues, § 6-5-338(a) does not apply to jailers. More specifically, she states: "Because Bryars was not performing any of the duties enumerated in § 6-5-338, but rather was acting as a dispatcher/jailer, he should not be cloaked with § 6-5-338 immunity. His performance of the duties of jailer/dispatcher was outside the 'line and scope of his ... law enforcement duties.'" Howard's brief, at 66 (emphasis added). We disagree.
Simply stated, the statute shields every defendant who (1) is a "peace officer," (2) is performing "law enforcement duties," and (3) is exercising judgment or discretion. It is undisputed that Officer Bryars was a sworn law-enforcement officer at the time of Bowens's suicide, and that he was temporarily serving as a jailer/dispatcher while he was recuperating from surgery. The first element is, therefore, satisfied. The second inquiry is whether the guarding of a city jail by a regular police officer is one of the "law enforcement duties" contemplated by the statute. We answer that question in the affirmative.
"All cities and towns of this state ... have the power to establish, erect, maintain and regulate jails, ... and to purchase and provide for any and all things which may be deemed advisable or necessary thereto ...." Ala. Code 1975, § 11-47-7. Thus, it requires no stretch of logic to conclude that the operation of jails by municipal police departments is a "law enforcement" function. Indeed, this Court has expressly determined that a "jailer ... is a peace officer," and has adopted the view that the "custodian of a convict" is a "law enforcement officer ... engaged in the active discharge of his lawful duty," within the meaning of Act No. 746, § 3, Ala. Acts 1967, formerly codified at Ala. Code 1975, § 13-1-42 (criminalizing assault on a "peace officer or other law enforcement officer ... engaged in the active discharge of his lawful duty") (repealed by Act No. 607, § 9901, Ala. Acts 1977). House v. State, 380 So. 2d 940, 941 (Ala. 1979). In doing so, this Court explained:
"'"Whether those performing [the duties of a correction officer] bear the title of jail guard, warden or correction officer, overseeing the custody and punishment of law violators is as much a part of law enforcement as undertaking the detection and appre
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