 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Howard v. City of Atmore12/12/2003
s us to no statute, rule, or regulation binding on Chief McKinley that purports to direct him in a particular manner as to the "administration of department," or to the training and supervision of its personnel. She merely contends that Chief McKinley's department has failed "to implement modern penalogical practices such as intake screening forms or processes, removal of potentially lethal means of suicide such as shoe strings and belts (even after recommendations by the ABI)," and, in this respect, has "lagged behind evolving standards of detention and incarceration." Howard's appellate brief, at 50.
These allegations are based, however, on statistics regarding annual suicide rates from general publications, such as, National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prison Suicide: An Overview and Guide to Prevention (1995).
Thus, there is a conspicuous absence of binding authority as to how to identify and handle a potential suicide risk and what precautions to take in any particular case. In the final analysis, the responsibility falls upon Chief McKinley to formulate suicide-prevention rules for his department, based on a myriad of factors, including the availability of resources and personnel. Category (2) of the Cranman formula expressly contemplates this scenario.
In this connection, Howard argues that category (2) does not specifically mention "training." She says: "In category (2)(d), this Court identified certain conduct of supervisory personnel such as Chief McKinley as immune. This Court included hiring, firing, transferring, assigning or supervising. It did not include training." Howard's appellate brief, at 41 (emphasis added). Thus, she argues, "the conduct that is challenged in this case, i.e., training, implementing/enforcing procedures, and identification and handling of potentially suicidal persons in confinement, [does] not fit within any category of conduct recognized by [Cranman] as immune." Id. Once again, Howard reads Cranman too rigidly. " he situations listed in subparagraphs (2)(a)-(d) of the Cranman immunity rule are expressly only 'examples' of the general principle stated in paragraph (2) itself." Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21, 31 (Ala. 2002). Category (2)(a)-(d) includes "training," as well as "supervising."
Howard has made no showing -- or argument -- that Chief McKinley acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his authority. Thus, Howard has not met her burden to show that Chief McKinley's conduct falls within an exception to State-agent immunity. The trial court did not err, therefore, in entering a summary judgment in his favor. We next address Howard's claims against the City.
C. The City
Howard contends that the City is "vicariously liable for the neglect, carelessness and unskillfulness" of Chief McKinley and Officer Bryars. It is well established that, if a municipal peace officer is immune pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then, pursuant to § 6-5-338(b), the city by which he is employed is also immune. Section 6-5-338(b) provides: "This section is intended to extend immunity only to peace officers and governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint peace officers." (Emphasis added.) See Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So. 2d 936, 940 (Ala. 2000). On the other hand, if the statute does not shield the officer, it does not shield the city. Borders v. City of Huntsville, [Ms. 1020452, July 25, 2003] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2003).
In this case, § 6-5-338 shields the City from liability for the alleged "neglect, carelessness and unskillfulness" of Chief McKinley. Thus, the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment for the City with respect to the claims
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Alabama Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|