 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.12/19/2003
his action against State Farm is allowed under the Howton rule; we disagree. Howton involved a factual scenario similar in some respects to the one here: an automobile accident in which the driver of one car was insured by State Farm, which negotiated directly with the driver of the other car, who was not insured by State Farm. We held that the plaintiffs could maintain certain direct actions against State Farm; however, this holding was driven by the nature of State Farm's negotiations with the plaintiffs:
"'Following the collision, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company agreed with the plaintiffs for the plaintiffs to have their vehicle repaired by Long-Lewis Ford and the defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company agreed, prior to the time of the repairs, to pay for the costs of the repairs. In reliance the agreement, the plaintiffs delivered their automobile to Long-Lewis Ford and Long-Lewis Ford repaired it. Following the repairs, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company refused to pay the bill unless the plaintiffs endorsed a check that contained a general release. Demand was made on State Farm to pay for the property damage, with a reservation of plaintiffs' rights to claim damages for personal injury , and the demand was refused.'"
Howton, 507 So. 2d at 449 (quoting the trial court's order) (emphasis added).
Unlike Howton, where State Farm "agreed, prior to the time of the repairs, to pay for the costs of the repairs," 507 So. 2d at 449, here there was no "new and independent obligation" created by State Farm in its negotiations with Williams. The evidence before the trial court indicates that State Farm agreed to pay Williams a certain amount for the lost use of his tractor-trailer, and Williams disputed the sufficiency of that amount. Had Williams accepted that amount and had State Farm then reneged or tried to place conditions on the distribution of the amount, then, under Howton, Williams might be able to, for example, bring a breach-of- contract action against State Farm on the basis of the "new and independent obligation" created by State Farm. Williams's bad-faith claim is actually a direct action against State Farm based on Shaw's alleged liability, even if dressed in different clothes.
However, it is well established that a party cannot bring an action against an insurance company for bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim if the party does not have a direct contractual relationship with the insurance company. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 304 (Ala. 1999) (noting that "' he plaintiff in a "bad faith refusal" case has the burden of proving: (a) an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant ....'" (quoting National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982)); Aplin v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 568 So. 2d 757, 758 (Ala. 1990) (stating that "proof of the existence of an insurance contract between the parties is a threshold requirement in a bad faith claim").
This rule accords with the language of ยง 27-12-24, which is clearly directed at regulating insurers' contractual relationships with their insureds for the protection of the insureds, not third parties. It is undisputed that Williams has no contract of insurance with State Farm and that Williams procured no judgment against Shaw's estate before bringing his action against State Farm. Given the above, State Farm was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
We conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that State Farm was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court's summary jud
Page 1 2 3 4 Alabama Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|