 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
General Motors Corp. v. Jernigan12/12/2003
BR>
"In qualifying the jury, the trial court advised the prospective jurors that the defendants were represented by two law firms. The court identified them by firm names and identified the member or members of those firms who were present in court at the time the jury was being qualified. The court then propounded the following question: 'Are any of you kin by blood or marriage to any of the gentlemen to either one of those law firms?'
"It is conceded that none of the prospective jurors responded to that question.
"It is further conceded that one of them, to whom we will sometimes hereinafter refer as the subject juror, was the first cousin of the wife of a member of one of the law firms which represented the defendants, at the time of their marriage in 1948. That member of the firm was not in court at the time."
286 Ala. at 705, 246 So. 2d at 432 (emphasis added). The Court held that " he subject juror was related by affinity within the fifth degree according to the rules of the civil law to a member of one of the law firms which represented the defendants" and that "the subject juror could have been successfully challenged for cause in a case in which the wife's husband or his firm appeared as counsel." 286 Ala. at 706, 246 So. 2d at 432 (emphasis added).
Myron Penn was an "attorney in the case to be tried" within the meaning of § 12-16-150(11), as construed in Dan River Mills. GM was entitled to have its challenges for cause as to Penn's relatives granted. We note that the trial court based its denial of the challenges for cause made pursuant to § 12-16-150(11) on an interpretation of the statute provided by Jernigan's counsel--that the statute applied to persons within a certain degree of kinship to parties in the case, but not to relatives of the lawyers in the case. Because the statute clearly applies to veniremembers who are related to attorneys, the trial court's denial of GM's five challenges for cause based upon § 12-16-150(11) was erroneous. We must now determine whether the denial of those five challenges for cause deprived GM of a substantial right. See Southern Ry. v. Milan, 240 Ala. 333, 199 So. 711 (1940).
At least since 1965, this Court has held that the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause was reversible error. The Court initially did so in the aftermath of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), dealing with challenges to jurors in a capital-murder case. However, long before Swain, this Court had treated the denial of a challenge for cause as harmless error where a peremptory challenge was thereafter used to remove the prospective juror from the venire and an impartial jury was seated. See Turner v. State, 160 Ala. 55, 49 So. 304 (1909).
The United States Supreme Court retreated from Swain in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), and United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000), applying a harmless-error rule comparable to that employed by our Court in Turner v. State. We followed suit in two cases dealing with the trial court's erroneous granting of a challenge for cause. See Dailey v. State, 828 So. 2d 340 (Ala. 2001), and Evans v. State, 794 So. 2d 411 (Ala. 2000). In Bethea v. Springhill Memorial Hospital, 833 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2002), we overturned several post-Swain cases and applied the harmless-error rule to the trial court's erroneous denial of a challenge for cause.
There is an important distinction between the present case and the Court's pre-Swain cases embracing harmless error and its post-Ross and Martinez-Salazar return to the harmless-error rule. In each instance in which we have applied the harmless-error rule, we have been pres
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Alabama Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|