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Martinmaas v. Engelmann6/28/2000
actice medicine. At trial Plaintiffs made numerous references to the fact that Engelmann no longer had a medical license. In addition, Plaintiffs' counsel inadvertently asked Martinmaas if she was aware Engelmann "had his medical license suspended in September of 1994?" This misstatement (Engelmann voluntarily surrendered his license; it was not suspended) prompted a motion for a mistrial, which was denied.
[ ] Engelmann claims this evidence is not only irrelevant, but also prejudicial. He argues that the repeated references to the fact that he no longer had a medical license, coupled with the misstatement by Plaintiffs' counsel, created a prejudicial impression in the minds of the jurors, i.e. it allowed the jury to infer that some authority had determined he should no longer be practicing medicine.
[ ] Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim Engelmann's lack of a medical license is relevant to the case, because it was their allegations of assault that caused him to voluntarily surrender it. Further, they argue the lack of a license was relevant to impeach his credibility, and the information was used to undercut his opinions about the standard of care and proper pelvic examination procedure. According to Plaintiffs, if any other non-licensed doctor had taken the stand and testified as an authority as Engelmann did, the lack of his or her license would have been properly elicited. Thus, they argue that Engelmann was rightfully impeached by evidence showing that he did not possess a medical license. We agree.
[ ] SDCL 19-12-1 (Rule 401) provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Relevant evidence is admissible; irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. SDCL 19-12-2 (Rule 402). Even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403).
[ ] Here, it is clear the trial court weighed the probative-versus-prejudice factors as they related to Engelmann's license status. It found some probative value in the fact that he no longer had a license, but drew short of allowing in all related evidence, likely because of concerns about prejudice. A review of the record shows that Plaintiffs used this information to impeach the credibility of Engelmann, who was repeatedly referred to as "doctor" throughout the trial by his counsel. "The court performed the balance carefully as evidenced by the fact that it did reject some evidence sought to be introduced..." State v. McDonald, 500 NW2d 243, 247 (SD 1993). The evidence was properly limited to only probative information, accordingly the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
[ ] Affirmed.
[ ] SABERS and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.
[ ] KONENKAMP, Justice, concurs in result.
[ ] AMUNDSON, Justice, dissents.
KONENKAMP, Justice (concurring in result).
[ ] The method by which we reach a decision is as important as the decision itself. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals 274 (1960). For, whether it be true or false, our method may well shape the outcomes of cases to follow. To decide a question, we first categorize the problem. If a tort, we ask, what type of tort? Both the rules and the consequences applying to one tort may not apply to another. Here, we must distinguish a negligent act from an intentional one, a medical error from an act of barbarity. If we blur the differences, if we degrade the methods to dist
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