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Farver v. Carpenter6/23/2000
Plaintiff is a former employee of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor Lockheed Martin in Oak Ridge, and the defendant, a psychiatrist, performed an evaluation of plaintiff at DOE's behest. Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging he misdiagnosed her as paranoid and delusional, which she averred caused her to lose her security clearance and resulting damages.
From 1987 to 1999, plaintiff worked at the Y-12 and K-25 plants, where she was allegedly exposed to radiation and toxic chemicals, which caused her to suffer physical illness. In January of 1997, plaintiff participated in a security interview with a DOE examiner regarding an upgrade of her security clearance. She was then asked to consent to a psychiatric evaluation and defendant was instructed to evaluate her to "determine whether, in your professional opinion, she has an illness or mental condition which causes or may cause a significant defect in her judgment or reliability." Following an interview and psychological screening test, defendant sent a report to DOE which opined that plaintiff had a paranoid delusional disorder and needed additional psychiatric treatment and medication, and that he "would be concerned about her in a security setting because of her poor common sense, logic and judgment, and because of her paranoid delusion symptoms." This report was sent to DOE on March 1, 1997, and plaintiff's security clearance was revoked approximately one month later.
This case was tried before a jury who returned a verdict in the amount of $600,000.00 which was approved by the Trial Judge, and defendant has appealed.
First, defendant argues that plaintiff did not present competent, material evidence that defendant's breach of the standard of care was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The Tennessee malpractice statute requires plaintiff to prove that she suffered injuries which would not otherwise have occurred as a proximate result of defendant's negligence, which evidence must be established by expert testimony. Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-115. In this case, plaintiff's expert testified that defendant breached the standard to care by failing to seek external corroboration of plaintiff's claims of DOE conspiracy and cover-up before classifying her as paranoid and delusional. Plaintiff's expert further testified that he had also evaluated plaintiff, and after seeking corroborative information, had determined that she was neither paranoid nor delusional. Plaintiff's expert was then asked whether defendant's breach of standard care had harmed plaintiff, and he responded "certainly being labeled as she was would certainly have an impact on her security clearance which would impact on her livelihood."
During cross-examination, plaintiff's expert was asked about certain portions of the report of the DOE hearing examiner. Plaintiff's expert testified that he was aware that the hearing officer indicated reliance on testimony from plaintiff's own psychologist, as well as her statements made in the personal security interview, in making his determination. He conceded that he did not know the role defendant's report played in the revocation of her security clearance.
Defendant argues that plaintiff's proof does not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-115. This provision requires proof that is required in any negligence case, i.e., causation in fact, and proximate or legal cause. See Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996). Causation in fact has been defined as "but for" causation, as in the injury would not have occurred but for the negligence of defendant. Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1993). It is well settled that an injury can have more than one proximate ca
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