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Chase v. Springer6/22/2000
This is an appeal from summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in an action to enforce a California judgment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-6-101 et seq. Plaintiff attempted to amend in order to assert breach of contract when Defendant answered the petition with a contest of in personam jurisdiction of the California court in the underlying judgment. The trial court ruled that California lacked in personam jurisdiction and the proposed breach of contract amendment to the petition was denied. Plaintiff appeals and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and Remanded
Cain, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Koch and COTTRELL, JJ., joined.
OPINION
This appeal arises from an attempt to enforce a foreign judgment. On July 11, 1995, Appellant Mrs. Chase filed her petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. ยงยง26-6-101 et seq., to enforce a judgment entered by the Superior Court of California in the amount of $87,642.00. That judgment was entered March 24, 1993. The petition lay dormant for two years in Davidson County Circuit Court until Mrs. Chase eventually effected service on Mr. Springer, who answered her petition on October 20, 1997, and alleged that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over him so as to warrant full faith and credit under the United States Constitution and enforcement under the Tennessee statutes. On March 17, 1998, Mrs. Chase moved to amend her petition to allege a breach of contract claim which served as the subject of the California default judgment. On April 14 of that year, the trial court denied that motion. Despite Mrs. Chase's argument that the amendment should relate back to the time of the filing of her original petition, the trial court found that her original filing did not constitute a "pleading" sufficient for relation under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and 15.03. Thus the trial court found her breach of contract claim to be time barred. On April 5, 1999, Mr. Springer moved for summary judgment, alleging that under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56, no genuine issue of material fact existed and he was entitled to judgment on his claim that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. For her part Mrs. Chase renewed her motion to amend and filed a motion for summary judgment on her original enforcement petition. In a lengthy memorandum and order, the trial court denied Mrs. Chase's motions and entered summary judgment on behalf of Mr. Springer. From these adverse actions of the trial court Mrs. Chase appeals.
The standard of review is clear in appeals such as the one at bar. No presumption of correctness attaches to decisions granting summary judgments because they involve only questions of law. Hembree v. State, 925 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, on appeal, we must make a fresh determination concerning whether or not the requirements of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56 have been met. Hill v. City of Chattanooga, 533 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tenn. Ct. App.1975). In our inquiry we consider the pleadings and the evidentiary materials in a light most favorable to the motion's opponent, and we must draw all reasonable inferences in the opponent's favor. See Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn.1991); see also Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn.1993).
The trial court found that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Springer. Personal jurisdiction is a fact- sensitive creature. For the purposes of this inquiry only, Mr. Springer disputes none of those facts urged by Mrs. Chase to support personal jurisdiction in the California Superior Court. Thus, under the standard of
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