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Certainteed Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County12/22/2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that a summary judgment motion "shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise." In this case, the trial court struck the filing of a petitioner's summary judgment motion that was calendared for hearing more than 30 days before a previously continued trial date. The trial court concluded the 30-day statutory time limitation was not extended when the earlier trial date was continued. Because the trial court's conclusion is inconsistent with the plain language of the summary judgment statute and case law interpreting that language, we conclude petitioner is entitled to relief. Accordingly, its petition for a writ of mandate is granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Delores Patrich was survived by her former husband, John Patrich, and two adult children, Cecilia Marshall and Darrell Duncan (collectively Real Parties in Interest), who brought a wrongful death and survival action, alleging that Patrich died as a result of more than 20 years exposure to asbestos. Among the ten business entities named as defendants in the action are the two original petitioners in this writ proceeding, Union Carbide Corporation and CertainTeed Corporation.
Trial was originally calendared for August 2002. In June of that year, the trial court continued the trial to April 1, 2003.
On January 13, 2003, petitioners Union Carbide and CertainTeed filed an ex parte application to (1) shorten the notice period for hearing summary judgment motions, or (2) allowing the motions to be heard less than 30 days before trial. The trial court denied the application because (1) it concluded that it could not shorten the statutorily required 75-day notice period for hearing the summary judgment motions, and (2) no court date was available to hear a summary judgment motion between March 28, when a summary judgment motion first could be heard consistent with the minimum 75-day notice requirement, and the new April 1 trial date.
Three days later, petitioners moved to continue the trial for at least seven days to enable their summary judgment motions to be heard before trial. On February 4, 2003, the motion wad denied.
On February 13, 2003, petitioners moved for relief under section 473 due to its failure to file a summary judgment motion before December 31, 2002. On February 25, 2003, the motion was denied
On April 1, 2003, the trial was trailed. On April 23, 2003, the court, on its own motion, continued the trial to September 16, 2003. The court stated in its order that in limine motions would be heard on the new trial date and that " o other dates are continued." According to a declaration of petitioners' counsel's declaration, when he advised the court that his clients intended to move for summary judgment, the court stated the parties would have to cite authority allowing them to file summary judgment motions "after the trial date had been continued."
On May 30, 2003, petitioners moved for summary judgment, noticing the motions for August 13, 2003, which was more than 30 days before the new September 16 trial date. In their motions, petitioners cited authority for the proposition that "the 30-day time limit [before trial] on summary judgment h
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