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District of Columbia v. Chinn12/31/2003
in the instant case. See, e.g., Holder v. District of Columbia, 700 A.2d 738, 741 (D.C. 1997). In the case of assault and battery, a plaintiff can recover for assault by proving "intentional and unlawful attempt or threat, either by words or acts, to do physical harm to the plaintiff," and for battery by proving an "intentional act that causes harmful or offensive bodily contact." Id. Usually these technical requirements of assault and battery are satisfied, such as here where there is no question that a battery occurred, and the outcome of the case turns on the defense of privilege:
A police officer has a qualified privilege to use reasonable force to effect an arrest, provided that the means employed are not "in excess of those which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary."
Id. (quoting Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 916 (D.C. 1993)). "The reasonableness of a particular act of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20-20 vision of hindsight." Etheredge at 916 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). Under the rule of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 133 (1965), liability is imposed only for the harm done by the use of such force as was excessive, unless the harm cannot be differentiated.
"In order to prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove the 'applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.'" Holder at 741 (quoting Etheredge at 917). Moreover, the District is vicariously liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for negligence by its officers who are acting within the scope of their employment. Id.
This case is hardly the first time that this court has encountered confusion regarding negligence and battery claims in alleged police brutality suits.
Although we have at times remarked on the similarities and differences of these causes of action [battery and negligence], we have never precisely delineated them from one another. . . . That we have previously remarked
upon the similarities of these causes of action is unsurprising because they all fundamentally involve an inquiry into the reasonableness of the police officer's actions.
Holder at 742. Decisions such as Holder have thus recognized "the perhaps somewhat confused and overlapping legal principles relating to police use of force." Id.
Battery is an intentional tort. "Intent and negligence are regarded as mutually exclusive grounds for liability. As the saying goes, there is no such thing as a negligent battery." 1 DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS §26 at 51 (2001). Strictly speaking, a police officer effecting an arrest commits a battery. If the officer does not use force beyond that which the officer reasonably believes is necessary, given the conditions apparent to the officer at the time of the arrest, he is clothed with privilege. Otherwise, he has no defense to the battery, at least insofar as it involves the use of excessive force.
As we noted in Holder, "where there is sufficient evidence to submit to a jury the question of assault and battery [that is, where a reasonable jury could conclude that excessive force was used] there may be, on the facts of a particular case, sufficient evidence to submit the question of negligence as well." 700 A.2d at 742 (emphasis added). Both issues "involve an inquiry into the reasonableness of the police officer's actions. For assault and battery the inquiry is whether the officer's conduct was reasonably necessary and thereby privileged; and for negligence the inquir
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