 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hendrickson v. King County6/23/2000
swim coaches substituting as lifeguards to maintain current certificates in '(ii) Safety training for swim coaches {STSC} through ARC {American Red Cross}; or (iii) Other training the department determines equivalent.' WAC 246-260-100(5)(c). As the County suggests, this 'other training' may include various courses in lifeguard training listed at WAC 246-250-100(5)(a).
STSC instructors teach that swimmers should enter the water feet first during workouts unless they are performing a racing start under the direct supervision of the coach, and the STSC manual states that coaches should not allow diving in less than nine feet of water. Lifeguard training teaches that swimmers should not be allowed to dive in less than nine feet of water. Although Coach Farrell had STSC training in 1989, his certification had lapsed at the time of Hendrickson's injury and the assistant coaches had never taken the required training.
And finally, the County's negligence proximately caused Hendrickson's injury when it mismarked the pool depth by the bulkhead. Coach Farrell testified that he allowed swimmers to dive from the bulkhead because he felt that 'starting dives were safe in the area of six {feet} of water.' He believed that the water right by the bulkhead was six feet deep, when it was in fact only 5 feet 2 inches at the deepest. The foregoing evidence supports the reasonable conclusion that the County's negligence proximately caused Hendrickson's injury.
Further, the Hendricksons presented sufficient proof of legal causation. Legal causation rests on policy considerations as to how far the consequences of a defendant's actions should extend. Baughn, 107 Wn.2d at 146. The proximate cause of the injury must be 'a part of the natural and continuous sequence of events' flowing from the defendant's negligence. Baughn, 107 Wn.2d at 146 (quoting Pratt v. Thomas, 80 Wn.2d 117, 119, 491 P.2d 1285 (1971)).
There was evidence that (1) no one had told Hendrickson not to dive from the bulkhead or that doing so could lead to serious injury ; (2) a properly trained coach would have emphasized the risks inherent in diving into shallow water; (3) Hendrickson assumed it was safe to dive into five feet of water because his coaches had not told him it was not safe; (4) the coaches failed to give this advice because the County had not properly trained them; and (5) the County breached its duty to Hendrickson by failing to properly train the coaches. Thus, a jury could reasonably find that the County's negligence was the legal cause of Hendrickson's injury. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the County's motion to dismiss for failure to prove causation.
B. Motions for Directed Verdict and for Judgment as a Matter of Law
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a directed verdict or JMOL, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Wright v. Engum, 124 Wn.2d 343, 356, 878 P.2d 1198 (1994). As the Wright court stated: A directed verdict or judgment {as a matter of law} is appropriate if, when viewing the material evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say, as a matter of law, that there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inferences to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party. . . .
The inquiry on appeal is limited to whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. Denial of a motion for directed verdict or judgment {as a matter of law} is inappropriate only when it is clear that the evidence and reasonable inferences are insufficient to support the jury's verdict. 124 Wn.2d at 356 (quoting Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251, 271-72, 830 P.2d 646 (19
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Washington Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|