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Pinter v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.6/30/2000
cene of an automobile collision in his professional capacity, and the EMT sustains an injury while performing his duty to provide emergency care, public policy prohibits the EMT from maintaining a cause of action based on the negligent driving that caused the collision. We emphasize that our public policy analysis is based on the fact that the only negligence Pinter complains of is the same negligence that caused the initial emergency and resulted in rescue personnel being called to the scene. Under these limited circumstances, public policy bars Pinter's cause of action.
. In conclusion, we answer the certified question in the affirmative: the firefighter's rule, as adopted in Hass, 48 Wis. 2d 321, bars an emergency medical technician (EMT) from pursuing a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident. However, we emphasize that in Wisconsin the so-called "firefighter's rule" in Hass is merely one application of the standard public policy analysis that applies to all negligence claims.
. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
By the Court. -- The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting). The majority opinion attempts to fit this case within the public policy considerations for denying liability for negligent conduct, which are the grounds used to explain the firefighter rule in Wisconsin. The public policy applied in the firefighter case was that imposing liability would place "too great a burden on homeowners, and other occupiers of real estate . . . would permit the law of negligence to enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point" (citation omitted). Hass v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 327, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970).
. The majority opinion simply concludes, without explanation or justification, that permitting the EMT in this case to recover damages places an unreasonable burden on drivers who negligently cause collisions; that the EMT's injury is simply too remote from the initial acts of negligence that caused the collision; and that permitting the action to proceed would enter a field with no sensible or just stopping point. Majority op. at 47. I am not persuaded. Negligence law imposes liability on negligent drivers for greater burdens and more remote injuries than would be imposed for injury to the EMT. The usual rules applicable to negligence actions suffice to address the majority's concerns.
. The majority opinion applies the public policy doctrine underlying the firefighter rule to firefighters and EMTs because " embers of both professions have special training and experience that prepare them to provide assistance under dangerous emergency conditions." Majority op. at 43. The rule the majority opinion adopts seems to apply to a host of paid employees and volunteers, both in public and private service. Are doctors or nurses who work in emergency rooms or in ambulances barred from recovery for injuries caused by the negligence of a tortfeasor? Are teachers who assist children under dangerous emergency conditions barred from recovery for injuries caused by a negligent pupil? Are private-sector safety supervisors trained in emergency responses to toxic spills or petroleum fire-fighting barred from recovery for injuries caused by a negligent tortfeasor?
. The number of factual scenarios to which the majority's reasoning can be applied is troubling. The holding in this case is contrary to the general rule that cases in which a causally negligent tortfeasor is relieved of liability are infrequent and present unusual and extreme considerations.
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