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Ditto v. McCurdy12/3/2003
31, 1994 an appeal from an order that purports to be a final order as to all claims and parties in civil cases may be taken only after the order has been reduced to a judgment in favor of or against the parties. . . . If claims are resolved by a series of orders, a final judgment upon all the claims must be entered. The "judgment shall not contain a recital of the pleadings," HRCP 54(a), but it must, on its face, show finality as to all claims against all parties.
Jenkins, 76 Hawaii at 119-20, 869 P.2d at 1338-39 (emphases added) (emphasis and footnote in original omitted). Clearly, the rule in Jenkins -- to wit, that circuit court orders resolving claims against parties must generally be reduced to a judgment and the judgment must be entered in favor of or against the appropriate parties pursuant to HRCP Rule 58 before an appeal may be taken -- is limited to circuit court orders disposing of claims raised in a circuit court complaint.
Furthermore, neither precedent nor logic compels us to extend the rule in Jenkins -- requiring a separate judgment -- to the post-judgment order at issue here. The sole purpose of HRCP Rule 58's separate document requirement is to clarify when the time for appeal commences. Jenkins, 76 Hawaii at 118, 869 P.2d at 1338 (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978); Moore's Federal Practice 58.02.1 (1993)). In the context of initial litigation, with claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, and multiple orders deciding them, a dispositive document that is distinct from any decision or order serves to eliminate confusion as to which order ends the litigation. Cf. Hollywood v. City of Santa Maria, 886 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1989) ("In the context of final judgments, the requirement that the dispositive document be distinct from any opinion serves to eliminate confusion as to which order ends the litigation." (citing Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 384)); Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86Hawaii 214, 262, 948 P.2d 1055, 1103 (1997) ("this court has always deemed the federal courts' interpretation of the FRCP as highly persuasive because our own HRCP were patterned after the federal rules" (citations omitted)). Thus, Jenkins required a separate judgment resolving all claims. Here, there is no comparable risk of confusion with respect to a post-judgment order granting a return of garnished funds and costs and denying attorneys' fees where the order is properly entered in the record, cf. Hollywood, 886 F.2d at 1232 (reaching the same conclusion regarding an order denying a motion for a new trial where the order was properly entered on the docket sheet), and resolves the motion requesting relief.
As previously indicated, the March 24, 2000 order definitively signaled the end of the matters raised in McCurdy and PCT's November 16, 1999 motion. The March 24, 2000 order was entered in the record in compliance with HRCP Rules 58 and 79(a) (2000) as an order granting in part and denying in part McCurdy and PCT's November 16, 1999 motion and was properly served upon the appropriate parties in compliance with HRCP Rule 77(d) (2000). The "entry" complied with all of the requirements of the HRCP, and it was unnecessary for the circuit court to enter a second document.
Accordingly, the time for appealing the matters conclusively decided by the March 24, 2000 order commenced upon entry thereof, not upon entry of the superfluous September 28, 2000 judgment on the order. Pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) (2000), " hen a civil appeal is permitted by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or appealable order." Ditto's October 30, 2000 notice of appeal and McCurdy and PCT's December 19, 2000 cross
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