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Dyet v. McKinley12/4/2003
greed on the following grounds:
(1) Even if the decision to exclude the evidence of the write offs were in error, the use of a special verdict which separated the medical damages from other damage elements eliminated the potential harm to McKinley.
(2) There is nothing in the verdict that indicates that the jury used some multiple of the medical expenses to reach a general damage figure (although attorneys regularly do such to evaluate a case.) Rather, it appears to the [district court] that the jury reached a decision about a fair total award of damages, then subtracted out the special damages to reach the general damage award. Such a process actually favors McKinley as a result of the Court's remittitur herein.
The district court was aware that it was exercising discretion and laid out its legal analysis, its rationale, and the supporting evidence presented at trial very carefully. The district court acted within its discretion when it denied McKinley a new trial.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED MCKINLEY'S POSTTRIAL MOTION TO REDUCE THE VERDICT BY THE $75,000 IN UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS DYET RECEIVED FROM HER OWN INSURER
McKinley maintains that the district court erred when it denied his motion to reduce the verdict by the $75,000 that was paid Dyet in underinsured benefits by her own insurance company. Idaho Code § 6-1606 provides that "collateral sources shall not include... benefits paid which are recoverable under subrogation rights under Idaho law or by contract." McKinley says that the district court wrongly assumed that it does not matter if the benefit provider actually exercises its right to recover benefits, and wrongly assumed that it only matters that a subrogation right exists. McKinley asserts that Dyet has refused to reveal whether her insurer has exercised or waived insurance rights, and therefore the court cannot decide whether such benefits are collateral sources under the terms of the statute, maintaining that waived subrogation rights are inherently not "recoverable," and therefore should be considered collateral sources.
A. Standard of Review
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court exercises free review. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 961-62, 751 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1988), overruled on other grounds by J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991).
B. The District Court Correctly Deemed the $75,000 Received From Hartford Insurance as a Non-Collateral Source
I.C. § 6-1606 states "collateral sources shall not include à benefits paid which are recoverable under subrogation rights created under Idaho law or by contract." I.C. § 6-1606 (emphasis added). The definition of "recoverable" is commonly accepted as capable of being recovered. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2066 (9th ed. 1935). The relevant legislative history indicates that the policy behind I.C. § 6-1606 is to prevent the double payment of damages, not to prevent payment only in the absolute case that a third party exercises its contractual rights to recovery.
In an effort to prove the recoverability of the amounts received from Hartford Insurance, Dyet placed into evidence the relevant portions of the insurance contract relating to the subrogation rights of amounts paid:
Our Right to Recover Payment:
A. If we make a payment under this policy and the person to or for whom payment was made has a right to recover damages from another we will be subrogated to that right. That person shall do:
1. Whatever i
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