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Illinois Tool Works12/31/2003
nd, therefore, the City of Chicago's $400,000 payment could "under no circumstances" be less than the $400,000 it actually paid the plaintiff.
As noted, in the present case, Tapecoat paid the Lucas plaintiffs $234,421.97 in settlement, but the trial court's finding that Tapecoat was 35% responsible required a pro rata share payment of $782,047.69 toward common liability. However, because Tapecoat's liability was capped under Kotecki at $234,421.97, $547,625.72 was left as uncollectible. Accordingly, ITW concludes, the remaining uncollectible amount of $547,625.72 should have been apportioned among the remaining joint tortfeasors, ITW and IMC, to determine what percentage of that uncollectible amount that each owes.
IMC first responds that ITW waived its right to seek reallocation of Tapecoat's allegedly uncollectible share as well as its right to rely upon section 3 of the Contribution Act because it failed to seek that relief or cite that section of the statute before the trial court, and argued only that the result it sought was dictated by Kotecki. IMC claims that ITW's Kotecki argument was misplaced because it failed to recognize the difference between seeking recovery from an employer and simply attributing fault to an employer in an action in which no recovery will ever be sought against the employer. And because the only authorities to which ITW cited involved actions against the employer -e.g., Claudy- they are distinguishable from the present case. Ultimately, IMC asserts that the trial court made a correct ruling based upon the authorities that ITW presented to it. However, because ITW failed to seek a reallocation of Tapecoat's allegedly uncollectible share and failed to cite section 3 of the Contribution Act to the trial court, its rights to make those arguments before this court are waived.
As IMC notes, it has long been held that arguments not raised in the trial court are considered waived on appeal. Killion v. Meeks, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1188, 1190 (2002). Indeed, other courts have used the waiver rule to find that a party who cites one statute to the trial court may not cite another statute for the first time on appeal, even where the statutes are part of the same legislative scheme. See, e.g., Jackson v. Cook County Regional Board of School Trustees, 282 Ill. App. 3d 191, 195-96 (1996) (held that the plaintiffs who relied upon one section of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7 (West 1992)) were not allowed to cite another section of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7-2(b) (West 1992)) on appeal).
In the present case, IMC argues that the trial court never had an opportunity to consider the application of section 3 of the Contribution Act, nor any opportunity to consider whether to reallocate the excess share in accordance with that section, because ITW failed to cite it. Accordingly, IMC asserts that ITW waived reliance on that statute and the right to seek reallocation, and that we should confine our review only to the relief requested and the authorities presented to the trial court. In that regard, IMC concludes, because the only authorities ITW cited in support of its arguments were distinguishable cases involving actions brought specifically against employers, we should affirm the trial court's decision.
Alternatively, IMC asserts that even if we were to find that ITW did not waive this argument, section 3 of the Contribution Act is inapplicable because Tapecoat's share of the responsibility is not "uncollectible." In looking to Minnesota case law, IMC argues that it is well established that "the obligation of a settling tortfeasor is not uncollectible." Gregor v. Clark, 560 N.W.2d 744, 745 (Minn. App. 1997).
In the present case, IMC r
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