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Colmar12/4/2003
ote that Colmar has failed to even allege that he was harmed by Anderson's conduct or that any wrong occurred as a result of the representation other than the mere procedural defect. Thus, we fail to see how the policy that underlies the invalidation of judgments procured through the unauthorized practice of law would be advanced by our application of the harsh general rule in this case. See People v. Woodall, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1161 (2002) (in considering defendant's request to nullify his multiple convictions on the basis that the prosecutor, though a licensed attorney, was not duly appointed to prosecute him, the court found "no reason" to overturn the defendant's convictions, in part, because the defendant did not attempt to demonstrate the harm visited upon him by his prosecutor's defective commission to prosecute). Accordingly, we decline to extend the general rule to apply to situations where an out-of-state attorney represents a client in arbitration in Illinois.
B. Exceeding the Arbitrator's Powers
Colmar next claims that the award should be vacated pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act because the arbitrator exceeded his power in making the award. See 710 ILCS 5/12(a)(1) through (4)(a) (West 2002) (an award may be vacated where (1) procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or misconduct on the part of the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; or (4) the arbitrators refused to postpone a hearing upon sufficient cause or to hear material evidence, so as to prejudice the rights of a party). Specifically, Colmar claims that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by: (a) allowing Anderson to represent FMNA; (b) refusing to hear evidence material to the controversy and failing to require defendant to produce evidence showing that it actively and aggressively marketed the film; and (c) declaring the contract terminated as of February 22, 2002.
It is important to note from the outset that the scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is nothing like the scope of an appellate court's review of a trial court's decision. Hawrelak, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 178, citing American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1996) (hereinafter AFSCME). There is a presumption that an arbitrator did not exceed his authority (Hawrelak, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 178 ), and if the arbitrators have acted in good faith, the award is conclusive upon the parties (Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 7-8 (1979)). Such deference is accorded because the parties have chosen in their contract how their dispute is to be decided, and judicial modification of an arbitrator's decision deprives the parties of that choice. Tim Huey Corp., 272 Ill. App. 3d at106. In accordance with this standard, we find that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by allowing Anderson to participate in the arbitration.
Referring to our previous discussion regarding the unauthorized practice of law, we note that there is no authority which explicitly prohibits an out-of-state attorney from representing a client in arbitration in Illinois. Thus, the arbitrator correctly determined that Anderson could participate. Furthermore, even if the arbitrator had committed an error of fact or misinterpreted applicable law in making that determination, we would not vacate the award merely on that basis. See Perkins Restaurants Operating Co. v. Van Den Bergh Foods Co., 276 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309-11 (1995). Instead, we would uphold the award as long as the arbitrator's decision was reasonable - even if we would have reached a different result. Perkins, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 310. In this case, i
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