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Smith v. Almonte12/24/2003
Reversed.
This appeal is from the trial court's granting of Linda Smith's motion requiring the Healthcare Stabilization Fund (Fund), see K.S.A. 40-3401 et seq., within the same fiscal year to make a second installment payment of $300,000 on an outstanding medical malpractice judgment. We reverse.
The issue before us is whether the trial court erred when it determined that K.S.A. 40-3403(d) requires the Fund to pay a second installment of $300,000 on an outstanding judgment after the physician's appeal was denied.
The facts are not disputed. Smith sued Rodolfo O. Almonte, M.D., claiming that Almonte negligently performed a medical procedure and that she suffered injuries due to his negligence. Smith was awarded $899,566.50 in damages at her trial. That matter was appealed, heard, and affirmed by this court in Smith v. Almonte, No. 87,404, unpublished opinion filed July 12, 2002. On June 20, 2002, the Fund made its first $300,000 installment payment. On September 4, 2002, Smith filed a motion in district court requesting the Fund make a second installment payment of $300,000. Almonte responded on September 20, 2002, arguing that the Fund was not required under the law to make an additional payment within the same fiscal year. The trial court granted Smith's motion, ordering the Fund to make a second $300,000 payment and not wait until the next fiscal year. Almonte filed this appeal on behalf of the Fund.
The journal entry of judgment establishing Almonte's liability was originally filed on May 17, 2001. Pending the appeal, the Fund filed a supersedeas bond that was approved on January 3, 2002. The Fund was one of Almonte's insurers responsible for paying the judgment. Almonte argues that under K.S.A. 40-3403(d), the Fund is only required to make one installment of $300,000 in the fiscal year following the denial of his appeal. This is a case of first impression, and we must interpret the statute.
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and an appellate court's review is unlimited. Williamson v. City of Hays, 275 Kan. 300, 305, 64 P.3d 364 (2003). Williamson states:
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. [Citation omitted.]" 275 Kan. at 305.
K.S.A. 40-3403(d) provides:
"All amounts for which the fund is liable pursuant to subsection (c) shall be paid promptly and in full except that, if the amount for which the fund is liable is $300,000 or more, it shall be paid, by installment payments of $300,000 or 10% of the amount of the judgment including interest thereon, whichever is greater, per fiscal year, the first installment to be paid within 60 days after the fund becomes liable and each subsequent installment to be paid annually on the same date of the year the first installment was paid, until the claim has been paid in full. Any attorney fees payable from such installment shall be similarly prorated."
The Fund argues that it did not become liable to pay the judgment until 60 days after our Court of Appeals filed its decision on July 12, 2002. Smith, on the other hand, claims that the Fund became liable as soon as the journal entry of judgment was filed and the first installment payment should have been due on July 17, 2001, which was 60 days after the journal entry was f
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