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BABB v. MATLOCK2/3/2000
This is a wrongful-death case in which we are asked to interpret the term "beneficiaries," as provided in Ark. Code Ann. ยง 16-62-102(d) (Supp. 1999). Appellants Tiny Standoak Babb, Gregory Franks, Shilena Easter, Michael Easter, Felisha Easter, Frederick Easter, and Daryl Standoak are the grandchildren of Allean Standoak, who died on March 29, 1997. Allean had four children: Appellee Leanna Matlock, Appellee Curtis Standoak, Theadoris Standoak, and Shirley Standoak. Appellants are the children of Theadoris Standoak and Shirley Standoak, both of whom predeceased Allean. In December 1997, Appellee Leanna Matlock was appointed special administratrix of Allean's estate for the purpose of bringing a wrongful-death suit. In August 1998, the Garland County Probate Court entered an order of settlement in the wrongful-death action. The order reflected that after payment of attorney's fees and satisfaction of liens
held by Medicare and Medicaid, the remainder of the settlement was divided between Appellees, the two surviving children. Appellants subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the wrongful-death action, claiming that they were Allean's heirs at law and thus beneficiaries of the settlement. The probate judge denied intervention, and this appeal followed. Our jurisdiction of this case is pursuant to Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 1-2(b)(1), as it involves issues of first impression. We affirm.
We review probate proceedings de novo, and we will not reverse the decision of the probate court unless it is clearly erroneous. Buchte v. State, 337 Ark. 591, 990 S.W.2d 539 (1999); Barrera v. Vanpelt, 332 Ark. 482, 965 S.W.2d 780 (1998). When reviewing the proceedings, we give due regard to the opportunity and superior position of the probate judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The questions presented by this appeal are: (1) whether the definition of "children" as used in section 16-62-102(d) should be interpreted broadly so as to include the descendants of those children of the deceased who predeceased the deceased; and (2) whether the relationship of in loco parentis continues past the age of majority for purposes of claiming as a beneficiary to a wrongful-death suit. We conclude that the answer to both questions is "No."
[2, 3] There was no cause of action for wrongful death at common law. Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Abbott, 288 Ark. 304, 705 S.W.2d 3 (1986); McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966). Thus, because the action is a statutory creation and is in derogation of or at variance with the common law, we construe the wrongful-death statute strictly. Id. Strict construction necessarily "requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed." Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 279, 984 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1998). Given that narrow standard, we must reject Appellants' first argument, that we should broadly construe the class of statutory beneficiaries to include persons not specifically named.
Section 16-62-102(d) provides:
The beneficiaries of the action created in this section are the surviving spouse, children, father and mother, brothers and sisters of the deceased person, persons standing in loco parentis to the deceased person, and persons to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis.
Clearly, grandchildren of the deceased person are not included in the group of statutory beneficiaries. It is equally clear that the term "children" means living children, as the entire group of beneficiaries is qualified by the term "surviving." Thus, children who are not living at the time of the deceased person's death are not among the statutory beneficiaries, and, correspondingly, neither are the dece
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